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ABSTRACT
INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONS:
EXAMINING THE BLACK BOX 
by
Edinaldo Tebaldi 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2005
This dissertation contributes to the literature by investigating the links 
between institutions and innovation from both a theoretical and an empirical 
standpoint. Specifically, this dissertation (i) develops a theoretical growth model that 
explicitly accounts for the influences of institutions on technical innovation and output 
production; (ii) specifies an empirical model suitable to examine the affect of 
institutions on technical innovation based on a theoretical model; and (iii) tests if 
different measures of institutions (i.e., Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory 
Quality and Expropriation Risk) have differentiated impacts on innovation.
A major prediction of the theoretical model is that better institutional 
arrangements boost innovation and thus economic growth. The lack of right 
institutions will retard or prevent the utilization of newly invented inputs in the 
productive process, leading to relatively lower levels of output. Therefore, controlling 
for all other determinants of income, countries or regions that experience institutional 
constraints preventing the adoption of newly invented technologies will be expected 
to lag behind in terms of growth and levels of output per capita. Additionally, the
x ii
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theoretical model shows that this gap does not vanish over time. The model also 
predicts that in the steady state the stock of human capital should not be associated 
with the growth rate of output, but rather that the growth rate of human capital should 
be associated with the growth rate of output.
The empirical analysis uses cross-country data and instrumental variables in 
order to examine the influences of institutions on technical innovation. The results 
support the argument that institutions explain much of the variation on patent 
production across countries and this finding is consistent across countries that are 
both on and off the technological frontier. The empirical results also provide 
evidence that control of corruption, market-friendly policies, protection of private 
propriety and a more effective judiciary system have growth effects on income 
because institutional quality affects an economy’s rate of innovation. Ultimately, 
innovation is the engine of economic growth. This study also finds evidence that 
geography, per se, does not explain innovation across countries. Geography affects 
innovation, but only through institutions.
x iii
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental challenge for the economics profession lies in explaining the 
mechanisms of economic growth. There is little doubt that significant progress has 
been made during the last five decades in growth modeling and economists’ 
understanding of the mechanisms of economic growth. It also appears that 
economists have reached a consensus on the notion that long-run economic growth 
is primarily a product of technical innovation. However, there is still much to learn 
about the factors that ultimately determine a country’s rate of innovation. This study 
endeavors to shed light on the determinants of innovation by examining the links 
between innovation and institutional arrangements from both a theoretical and an 
empirical standpoint.
Chapter 1 reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on institutions 
and economic performance and discusses the challenges of empirical examinations 
of the institutional influences on economic performance as well as the challenges of 
modeling institutions in a formal growth framework. A major finding from this review 
is that it has proven difficult to provide conclusive empirical evidence supporting the 
idea that institutions matter for economic growth. Although several studies have 
attempted to demonstrate that institutions affect transitional growth rates of output 
per capita (e.g. Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Barro, 1991 and 1996; Mauro, 1995; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2003), there is still no empirical evidence that supports a finding 
that institutions determine the steady state growth rate of per capita GDP. The 
review of the literature also shows that evaluations of the impacts of institutions on
1
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technical innovation have generally been disregarded in both empirical investigations 
of cross-country economic performance and formalized growth models. The survey 
of the literature also establishes the ad hoc nature of the econometric specification 
found in studies that evaluate the links between institutions and economic 
performance. More specifically, this review identifies the following important gaps in 
the institutional growth literature: i) the econometric specification used in institutions- 
related growth studies is not entirely supported by formal theoretical models; ii) the 
impact of institutions on technical innovation is overlooked in empirical investigations 
of cross-country economic performance; iii) there is no empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that institutions affect an economy’s steady state growth rate 
and iv) economists are still struggling to construct a methodology that incorporates 
institutions in formal growth models. Thus, an immediate and important task for 
economists agenda lies in addressing the effects of institutions on technical 
innovation. One could put these gaps together and argue that the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance has been treated as a black box. 
Ultimately, it is what is inside that black box that determines long-run economic 
performance.
This dissertation endeavors to contribute to the literature by investigating this 
black box. The study’s primary goal is the examination of the links between 
institutions and innovation from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. 
Specifically, this dissertation (i) develops a theoretical growth model that explicitly 
accounts for the influences of institutions on technical innovation and output 
production; (ii) specifies an empirical model suitable to examine the affect of 
institutions on technical innovation based on a theoretical model; and (iii) tests if
2
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different measures of institutions (i.e., Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory 
Quality and Expropriation Risk) have differentiated impacts on innovation.
This study allows us to evaluate the interactions between institutions and 
innovation by incorporating institutions into a formal growth framework. The model is 
used to compare growth outcomes under scenarios with institutional constraints with 
the outcomes of standard growth models. In addition, the model may potentially 
contribute to the debate on an open question in the growth literature: do institutions 
have a growth or level effect on income?
The theoretical model is built upon the endogenous growth literature, which 
emphasizes that innovation is a key mechanism in the generation of long-run 
economic growth. The model economy hypothesizes that poor institutions1 may 
inhibit the use of new technologies in the productive process as well as slow down 
the production of new and improved technologies. A major prediction of the 
theoretical model is that better institutional arrangements will boost innovation and 
thus steady state economic growth. For instance, the lack of proper institutions will 
retard or prevent the utilization of newly invented inputs in the productive process, 
leading to relatively lower levels of output. Therefore, controlling for all other 
determinants of income, countries or regions that experience institutional constraints 
preventing the adoption of newly invented technologies will be expected to lag 
behind in terms of growth and levels of output per capita. The model shows that this 
gap does not vanish over time. In addition, the model also predicts that in the steady 
state the stock of human capital should not be considered a determinant of the
1 In this study, “better institutional arrangement” or “better institutions” means that a country has
market-friendly policies (e.g. no price controls and no excessive burden imposed by regulations), 
controls for corruption, a judiciary system that is effective and predictable and a legal system that 
enforces contracts and protects property rights.
3
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growth rate of output, rather that the growth rate of human capital should be 
considered a determinant of the growth rate of output. This result contrasts with that 
found in Romer (1990) but conforms to Lucas (1988) and Jones (1995).
The empirical analysis conducted in this inquiry follows a growing branch of 
growth literature - starting with the influential papers of Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) and Barro (1991) - that utilizes subjective measures of institutions, such as 
enforcement of property rights, corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and civil 
liberty, to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements on economic 
performance. The approach used here adds to the literature by specifying a non ad 
hoc empirical model that relates institutions to innovation that is developed from the 
theoretical model constructed in chapter 2. This study also takes a more focused 
approach by examining the affects of different kinds of institutions (i.e., control of 
corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law and risk of expropriation) on patent 
production (innovation). This approach may shed light on two open questions in the 
growth literature. First, do institutions have a growth effect? Given that innovation is 
widely accepted as the engine of economic growth, the empirical model developed in 
this study may help to answer this question by showing that institutional quality does 
or does not affect an economy’s rate of innovation. Second, the empirical analysis 
has potential to contribute to appraise the following question: what types of 
institutional arrangements maximize growth and under what conditions? For 
example, are the institutions that promote growth the same for countries that are on 
the technological frontier as for those countries that are off the frontier? In other 
words, are the institutional arrangements that promote technological innovation 
similar or different from those that promote technological transfer?
4
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Chapter 3 presents the empirical analysis - which uses cross-country data 
and instrumental variables - of the influences of institutions on technical innovation. 
The results support the claim that institutions explain much of the variation on patent 
production across-countries. The positive influence of good institutions on innovation 
is consistent across countries both on and off the technological frontier. In addition, 
the results provide evidence that control of corruption, market-friendly policies, 
protection of private propriety and a more effective judiciary system have growth 
effects on income because institutional quality affects an economy’s rate of 
innovation. Ultimately, innovation is the engine of economic growth. This study also 
finds evidence that geography, perse, does not explain innovation across countries.
The rest of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 1 reviews both the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the connections between institutions and 
economic performance. It also discusses the limitations inherent in studies that 
attempt to examine empirically the association between innovation and institutions 
as well as the challenges involving modeling institutions within a formal growth 
framework. Chapter 2 develops a formal model that examines how institutions affect 
technical innovation and economic growth. Comparative statics are utilized to 
evaluate the impacts on growth and levels of output from changes in human capital 
and also from the intensity of the institutional constraints preventing the adoption of 
new technologies. Chapter 3 presents a workable empirical model for evaluating the 
impacts of institutions on innovation and also reports the results of the regression 
analysis. Chapter 4 is a brief summary of this study.
5
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CHAPTER 1
A LITERATURE REVIEW ON INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS
1.1 Introduction
A major challenge in assessing empirically the relationship between 
institutions and economic performance lies in the measurement of institutions. Until 
recently, it was not possible to evaluate the impact of institutions on economic 
performance due to the lack of a reliable dataset. Cross-country datasets created by 
Gastil (1979), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Transparency 
International (Tl), Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) and Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) helped to remedy this lack. These datasets provide 
subjective measures of the quality of institutions at the country level. They greatly 
contributed to the development of a new branch of empirical research into the 
association between institutions and economic growth.
Empirical research in this subject has been fruitful. It has been shown, for 
instance, that civil liberties (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Knack and Keefer, 1995), 
property rights (Knack and Keefer, 1995), democracy (Barro, 1991) and corruption 
(Mauro, 1995) affect the growth rate of per capita income. In addition, Hall and 
Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004) and McArthur and Sachs (2001) 
show that a risk of expropriation index and a constraint on executive index also 
affect the level of output per capita. However, robustness investigations have shown
6
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that these findings are dependent on the specification of the econometric model, 
choice of explanatory variables and instruments used as proxies for institutions (see 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2003).
From a theoretical standpoint, only a few studies have incorporated 
institutions into the formal mainstream framework currently used to evaluate 
economic growth (e.g. Huang and Xu, 1999; and Gradstein, 2004). According to 
Sala-I-Martin (2002), economists are still only scratching the surface of the linkages 
between institutions and economic factors that power growth.
The main goal of this chapter is to review both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on institutions and economic performance. This chapter also discusses the 
limitations inherent in studies that attempt to examine empirically the association 
between innovation and institutions as well as the challenges involved with modeling 
institutions in a formal growth framework.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the 
definition of institutions and presents the workable quantifications of institutions 
currently available. Section 3 discusses the methodology and key findings from 
empirical studies that evaluate the links between institutions and growth rates of per 
capita output. Section 4 focuses on the impact of institutions on levels of output per 
capita. Section 5 summarizes the key lessons from the empirics of institutions. 
Section 6 presents a survey of the theoretical models that link institutions and 
economic growth. Section 7 summarizes the chapter’s findings.
1.2 Quantifying Institutions
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines an institution as a “significant and 
persistent element (as a practice, a relationship, an organization) in the life of a
7
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culture that centers on a fundamental human need, activity, or value, occupies an 
enduring and cardinal position within a society and is usually maintained and 
stabilized through social regulatory agencies” (Merrian-Webster, 1993:1171). In line 
with this definition, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that the concept of 
institutions should be “interpreted broadly to encompass not only formal political and 
legal structures but culture as well” (p. 261). However, these definitions are very 
general and provide little aid in building a workable framework for the measurement 
of institutional arrangements. Sala-I-Martin (2002) suggests defining institutions as a 
set of elements related to the ways that a society and its economy works in modern 
capitalist countries. This study follows Sala-I-Martin (2002) and the word institutions 
(or institutional arrangements or institutional capital) is utilized to refer to a 
hypothetical aggregate variable that accounts for the following elements:
i) Law enforcement enforcement of property rights, existence of a 
working legal system and the independence of the judiciary system;
ii) Political institutions: democracy, political stability, public
representatives chosen by vote and the existence of class 
organizations;
iii) Market structure: economic freedom, anti-trust regulations, openness 
to international trade, modern bank system, working credit system and 
organized stock and bond markets;
iv) Transparency of the Public Administration: red tape, corruption and 
bureaucracy;
v) Sociocultural context: religious practices, entrepreneurial spirit and 
social ties.
8
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Empirical analyses on institutions have been conducted using objective and 
subjective measures of institutional quality. Objective measures quantify institutional 
aspects that are observable cross-country, such as the number of political 
assassinations, number of revolutions and coups and policy volatility. For instance, 
Barro (1991)’s study of the determinants of economic growth utilizes the number of 
revolutions between 1960 and 1985 and the number of political assassinations per 
year as right hand explanatory variables that control for institutional quality. The key 
argument for including such variables in growth-related regressions is that “property 
rights will be better guaranteed and transactions cost will be lower ... the more 
democratic the regime, the higher government stability, the lower political violence 
and the lower the policy volatility.” (Moers, 1999:5). A major drawback in using 
number of political assassinations, number of revolutions and coups and policy 
volatility as measures of institutional arrangements is that such variables are 
measures of the output of institutions, rather than direct measures of institutional 
arrangements.
The subjective measures of institutions are mainly assembled by private 
companies (e.g. ICRG, BERI and the Tl) and based on an assessment of 
perception. These companies conduct perception surveys of “economic agents who 
make growth-relevant decisions” (Moers, 1999:8) about factors such as corruption, 
contract enforcement, protection of property rights, political instability, etc. These 
perception assessments are compiled from surveys that ask both resident business 
people and non-resident experts for their appraisals of a specific institutional aspect. 
For instance, the Transparency International computes the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) using data from three groups of sources. One group of sources 
assembles data from the perceptions of non-resident experts, who reside in
9
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developed countries (Western Europe and North America), with regard to corruption 
in foreign countries. A second group of sources assembles data from the 
perceptions of non-residents experts, who reside in less developed countries, with 
regard to corruption in foreign countries. The perception’s assessments from these 
two groups are supposed to not be vulnerable to a “home-country bias”, which could 
cause cross-country comparison problems (Lambsdorff, 2004). However, they may 
reflect the analyst’s perspectives about the factors been analyzed and so they may 
be biased toward analysts’ beliefs (Lambsdorff, 2004; Glaeser et at, 2004).
The third group of sources assembles data from the perception of residents 
(mostly elite businesspeople and businesspeople) with regard to corruption in their 
home country. This assessment of corruption may suffer from measurement errors 
because “local economic agents may not be able to compare institutions across 
countries” (Moers, 1999:8). In addition, all three groups use different questionnaires 
to assess the perception of corruption2. However, according to Lambsdorff (2004), 
the assessment of corruption made by these three groups is highly correlated, which 
“ameliorate fears that any aforementioned biases are important to the results” 
(Lambsdorff, 2004:6).
The concerns about the assessment of perception discussed above also 
apply to most of the subjective measures of institutions. In addition, Glaeser et at 
(2004) criticize the use of subjective institutional measures in growth related 
empirical analysis, arguing that such variables “measure outcomes, not some
2 For instance, one of the sources of the third group asks the following question: “thinking about 
officials ... It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular “additional 
payments” to get things done”. (Always, Mostly, Frequently, Sometimes, Seldom, Never, Don’t 
know)” and “Using this scale (No Obstacle=1 ; Minor Obstacle= 2 ; Moderate Obstac!e=3 ; Major 
Obstacle=4 ; Don’t know/no answer=5)”. On the other hand, a source of the first group asks if the 
“rate the severity of overall corruption within the state on the following scale”: Low; Low/Modest; 
Modest; Modest/Severe; Severe.” (Lambsdorff, 2004:4).
10
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permanent characteristics” (p. 8) of a society’s institutional arrangements. 
Conversely, it has been argued that these institutional measures provide relevant 
information about growth-promoting institutional arrangements and that the mere 
existence of organizations such as the ICRG and BERI and the considerable price 
that entrepreneurs are willing to pay for this kind of data provide evidence on the 
accuracy of such institutional measures (Mauro, 1995; Moers, 1999).
Table A.1 provides a detailed list of workable variables that measure cross­
country institutional quality. Notice that specific elements of institutions have been 
quantified by different organizations. Therefore, one must choose particular 
indicators from the large set of institutional measures when conducting empirical 
analysis. Of course, a variable collected from different sources may produce 
conflicting results, which lessens the appeal for using such measures. To minimize 
this problem, Kaufmann et al. (2003) developed a dataset with six aggregate 
measures of institutions that combines data from more than a hundred variables and 
data sources from 18 different organizations.
The next sections discuss the methodology used to conduct empirics on 
institutions and economic performance and emphasize the key findings from 
previous literature.
1.3 The Empirics on Institutions and the Growth Rate of Output Per Capita
A vast literature uses cross-country data to evaluate the impact of institutions 
and other factors suggested by the theory, on growth rates of per capita income. 
This literature greatly benefited from the workable empirical framework developed by 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991), which is
11
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constructed around a Solovian-type model. Consider the well-know solution of the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model3:
where K denotes physical capital, C consumption, Y output, x is the growth rate of 
technology, n is the growth rate of population, 8-depreciation, p is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, f is a production function and f  denotes the marginal 
product of capital. Lowercase case variables denote ‘per effective labor’ measures, 
i.e., k=K/AL, c=C/AL, y=Y/AL. Equation 1.1 shows how capital is accumulated in the 
economy and equation 1.2 - the famous Euler equation -  shows the time path of 
consumption. Consider that output is produced using a CRS Cobb-Douglas
production function given by Y  = Ka(AL)1~“ . This equation can be easily rewritten in
terms of “effective labor” units as y = f(k) = k“ .4 Combining the production function 
and equations 1.1 and 1.2 and using log-differentiation allows one to write the 
system of equations as follows:
S 5 S S  =  e -< K ,)«k ) _  g-Jogle/k) _  (x  +  n + 5) (1.3)
3 This derivation is based on Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).
4 Although labor does not explicitly appear in this equation, from a firm’s perspective, labor is still 
a choice variable. Technology (A) is assumed to be exogenous.
k = f(k) -  c -  (x + n + 8)k (1.1)




d[log(c) _  1 (1-a)log(k) (1.4)
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Using the fact that at the steady state c and k are constant, that is, 
^  = 0 , taking a first-order Taylor expansion around the steady state




d(log(c) - a -
dt 0
x + n + S -
0
(p + 0x + 8)
a log(k /k*)
lo g (c /c ‘ )
(1.5)
It can be shown that the system’s two eigenvalues have opposite signs,
which implies saddle-path stability. The solution for k takes the form:
log(k) = log(k*) + ^ e 81* + X2e S2t (1.6)
where ^  and X2 are arbitrary constants, ei>0 and s2<0 are the roots of the system
and “*” denotes steady-state values. The system will converge to the steady state 
only if A,i=0. Therefore, the growth path of the economy is stationary only if we 
assume Xi=0. Imposing this condition and using k(0)=k0 produces:
^2 = log(k0)-lo g (k * )  (1.7)
Substituting (1.7) into (1.6) and using the fact that s2 = ~ p 5 generates 
log(k) = (1 -  e -pt)log(k*) + e~pt log(k0)
Since log(y) = a lo g (k ), the time path for log(y) is given by:
iog(y) = (1 -  e~pt)log(y*) + e~pt log(y0) (1.8)
P = 0.5<| f  + a ( — l(p  + 8 + 9x)| £ ± ? -+ 9x -  (n + x + 5)
V 0 y a
M2
-0 .5 ^
where \  =  p -  n(1 -  0)x > 0 . With a constant savings rate, =  -(1 -  a) (x + n + S).
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Therefore, log(y) is a weighted average of the initial and steady state values 
of income. Moreover, the weight on the initial value declines exponentially at the rate 
p. Equation 1.8 implies that the average growth of per capita output y , over an 
interval from an initial time 0 to time T, augmented by an error term is:
iog(y(T )/y(0)) ( i - e - pt). . * .= x + -— - — -log[y * /  y(0)] + ux
Most studies on economic growth write this equation in vector form:
g = plog(y0) + Xri + s (1.9)
where g is the growth rate of per capita income, y0 is initial per capita income, X is a 
matrix of determinants of steady-state per capita income, p measures the speed of 
convergence, r| is a vector of parameters and s is a random error term.
Moving from this theoretical equation to a workable empirical model requires 
strong assumptions. First, the choice of variables that proxy for differences in steady 
state positions is in general ad hoc. Table B.1 shows that initial income, investment 
and schooling are present in almost all growth regressions in the literature. However, 
it also shows that the conditioning set of variables change a lot across studies. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) demonstrate that a regression’s results may change 
significantly due to “small alterations” in the set of explanatory variables. Second, 
other than for convenience, there is no rationality for using initial values of the 
explanatory variables (e.g. education and investment) to proxy steady state income; 
y*. If the contemporaneous performance of the explanatory variables matters for 
current growth, the use of initial values will bias the coefficient estimates. Third, 
variables that proxy for differences in Steady state may be endogenous or correlated
14
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with the error term6. Fourth, without proper controls, spatial variation and shocks that 
benefit/hurt specific countries/regions will bias the parameter estimates (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin, 1995). In addition, this concept of convergence has been thought to be 
basically a “regression toward the mean” and may suffer from Galton’s fallacy 
problem (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Bliss, 1999; Cannon and Duck, 2000, Bliss, 
2000).7
Despite these shortcomings, equation 1.9 motivates most of the empirical 
analyses that link institutions to growth of GDP per capita. Particularly, institutional 
measures are added in the regression as part of the set of explanatory variables that 
proxy for steady state output per capita. Moreover, standard practice suggests using 
‘averages’ of the institutional measures over the sample available. The ‘averages’ 
are intended to capture the permanent characteristics of institutions. However, this 
procedure may hide directional change effects that may take place during the time 
period under examination. Table B.1 summarizes the most prominent analyses that 
utilize equation 1.9 to assess empirically the links between institutions and growth of 
GDP per capita. It shows that several alternative measures of institutions have been 
used in empirical analysis and the results concerning institutions and economic 
performance vary significantly across studies.
6 It is standard in the literature to use lagged values of the explanatory variables to address 
endogeneity.
7 Galton evaluated the height of fathers against the height of their sons. The results of his
analysis supported that i) sons of tall fathers tended to be tall, but on average not as tall as their
fathers; ii) sons of short fathers tended to be short, but on average not as short as their fathers.
Based on these findings, he concluded that the population height was regressing toward the
mean. “The reason for Galton’s observation lines in basic genetics. A tall father may not have
married an equally exceptionally tall wife. And even if the father has married a tall wife, not all 
tallness genes of the parents will express themselves in their offspring because some will be
recessive.... Galton’s fallacy was to wrongly infer from these valid observations that a general
contraction of the spread of heights in the population was taking places; a reduction in the 
variance of heights.” (Bliss, 1999:5).
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The influential paper written by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) is the first study 
that includes the quality of institutions in growth regressions. The authors utilize a 
dichotomous transformation of the Civil Liberty Index8, developed by Gastil (1979), 
as a measure of institutions. This transformation was supposed to purge spurious 
cardinality and account for measurement errors in the index. The regression analysis 
uses data from 47 countries and shows that the Civil Liberty Index is not significantly 
correlated with growth of per capita GDP, but it alone explains about 45% of the 
variation in investment. In other words, institutions seem to not affect growth rates of 
per capita output, but do affect investment. Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that 
these findings may not be robust because institutional quality is likely endogenously 
determined in the specification.
Barro (1991)’s prominent study shows that the frequency of coups and 
revolutions and number of assassinations per capita are inversely correlated with 
growth of GDP per capita and investment. This study supports the viewpoint that 
better institutional arrangements contribute to increased capital accumulation and 
boost transitional economic growth. However, this study’s finding does not support 
the view that institutions affect the steady-state growth of output per capita.
Levine and Renelt (1992) test if the results generally found in growth 
regressions, e.g. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Barro (1991), are robust to 
changes in the set of explanatory variables. They conclude that only the investment 
share of gross product and initial level of output are correlated with growth rates of 
per capita income. Variables such as the Index of Civil Liberties, frequency of coups 
and revolutions and regional dummies are not robust, that is, they turn insignificant
8 This index ranges from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). It takes into account subjective measures 
of freedom of expression and conscience, independence of the judiciary, absence of political 
prisoners and the like.
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as other variables are included (excluded) in (from) the regression. This finding 
suggests that either institutions do not matter for growth or that poor model 
specification or unreliable measures of institutions have been used in these empirical 
studies to appraise the effect of institutions on economic growth9.
Knack and Keefer (1995) introduces two new measures of institutions into 
their growth regression and show that the ICRG and BERI indexes are positively 
correlated with both growth of GDP per capita and investment10. The authors also 
find that the frequency of coups and revolutions and assassinations per capita are 
inversely correlated with growth of GDP per capita and investment. This study 
contradicts Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and provides evidence that the Index of 
Civil Liberties is not correlated with investment. They believe that simultaneity 
between investment and the index of Civil Liberties and small sample size explain 
the discrepancies in the results. Mauro (1995)’s main contribution is to show that 
corruption discourages investment and negatively affects the growth of GDP per 
capita. Controlling for corruption, Mauro (1995) finds that the frequency of coups and 
revolutions neither affects growth rates of GDP per capita nor investment.
Knack and Keefer (1997) revisit cross-country growth regressions using a 
different set of institutional variables. They find that the civil liberty index, political 
freedom index and Putnam’s measure of social capital do not explain growth. The
9 Sala-I-Martin (1997) argues that the procedure used by Levine and Renelt (1992) to test the 
significance of the variables “is too strong for any variable to pass it” (Sala-I-Martin, 1997:79). 
Sala-I-Martin (1997) runs “two million regressions” and concludes that the following proxies for 
institutions are significant in growth regressions: rule of law, political rights, civil liberties, number 
of revolutions and military coups and war dummy.
10 The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index is an average of the following indicators: 
quality of bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation risk and repudiation of 
contracts by government. The Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) index is an 
average of four indicators: bureaucratic delays, nationalization potential, contract enforceability 
and infrastructure quality.
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coefficients on Trust and Civic Cooperation are positive, but only marginally 
significant, which suggests that they may not be robust. It is worth noticing that 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Mauro (1995) use ethnolinguistic fragmentation as an 
instrument for institutions. However, Easterly and Levine (1997) and Acemoglu etal. 
(2000 and 2004) argue that ethnolinguistic fragmentation is not a good instrument for 
institutions because it may be endogenous. Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity may create 
political instability and have a direct effect on economic performance. Therefore, the 
findings from studies that use ethnolinguistic fragmentation as an identifier for 
institutions may be plagued by endogeneity problems.
More recent articles provide mixed evidence about the correlation between 
institutions and growth of per capita GDP. For instance, Esfahani and Ramirez 
(2003) find that democracy is negatively related with the growth of GDP per capita, 
while Oliva and Rivera-Batiz (2002) find a positive relationship but Levine and Renelt 
(1992) find no robust correlation between these variables. Hsiao and Shen (2003) 
find that corruption does not affect growth of per capita output, which contradicts 
Mauro (1995).
This brief review of the literature shows that “nearly all empirical studies of 
growth include the initial levels of income as a conditioning variable” (Bosworth and 
Collins, 2003:117) and are constructed around a Solovian-type theoretical model. 
Regardless these similarities, it also shows that differences in sample size, choice of 
the time period and differences in the set of explanatory variables have generated 
inconclusive predictions about the effect of institutions on growth of GDP per capita. 
Specifically, empirical studies on institutions and growth of per capita GDP provide 
only weak evidence to support the argument that institutions affect the growth rate of 
GDP per capita. This question remains open for further empirical investigation.
18
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Moreover, there is an additional fundamental problem in the previous studies. 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) regression-type (i.e., equation 1.9) does not provide 
evidence that institutions affect long-run growth rates of the economy. The 
dependent variable (growth rates of output per capita) only accounts for the 
transitional dynamics of per capita income over a specific period of time and cannot 
be interpreted as steady state growth rates of per capita income. Even if the 
coefficients on institutions were significant in this type of regression, they would only 
support the claim that institutions have a level effect on steady state per capita 
income. Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted as saying that institutions are 
not important. Level effects are welfare increasing.
1.4 The Empirics on Institutions and Levels of Output Per Capita
There is an indivisible link between growth and levels of GDP per capita, but 
empirical analyses that focus on levels of output differ fundamentally from those 
studies that evaluate growth of output. According to Hall and Jones (1999), empirical 
evaluations of levels of output per capita provide valuable information about 
standards of living, which is overlooked in the growth analyses. Moreover, Easterly 
et al. (1993) shows that the correlation between growth rates across decades is 
relatively low, which suggests, “that differences in growth rates across countries may 
be mostly transitory” (Hall and Jones, 1999:85). Therefore, studies focusing on 
different time periods may find different patterns of growth, leading to findings of an 
unstable relationship between institutions and growth rates of income per capita.
From an econometric standpoint, empirical analysis of levels of output per 
capita is very demanding in terms of techniques and controls for inherent 
endogeneity in the set of explanatory variables. Recent contributions to the literature
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have proposed specifying a model for levels of per capita output in terms of 
institutions and geography, which are deemed ‘deeper’ determinants of income. Hall 
and Jones (1999) hypothesize that social infrastructure is the “primary, fundamental 
determinant of a country’s long-run economic performance” (p.95).11 Acemoglu et al, 
(2000) argue that differences in institutions account for most of the differences in 
income per capita and that institutional are the basic determinant of income. This 
branch of the literature proposes to estimate the following ad hoc equation:
y = a.| + a 2T  + X a 3 + s (1.10)
where y is log of income per capita, T measures institutions, X is a matrix of “other” 
exogenous determinants of income, £ is random error term and a s are parameters.
Equation 1.10 has several drawbacks. First, it implies a linear relationship 
between institutions and log of per capita GDP. However, there is no theoretical 
reason to believe that this relationship is linear. Second, institutions (T) are not 
directly observable. W e only observe a set of variables that are potential proxies for 
institutions (T). Third, the choice of the set of ‘other’ exogenous determinants of 
income, X, is ad hoc and, in general, includes geographical variables such as mean 
temperature (as a proxy for climate), distance from the Equator and coastland. 
Finally, a key issue in this literature concerns the nature of institutions, that is; 
institutional arrangements (T) seem to be endogenously determined because 
institutions affect economic performance, but the economic environment may also 
affect the institutional arrangements of a society.
11 “By social infrastructure we mean the institutions and government policies that provide the 
incentives for individuals and firms in an economy. Those incentives can encourage productive 
activities such as the accumulation of skills or the development of new goods and production 
techniques, or those incentives can encourage predatory behavior such as rent-seeking, 
corruption and theft.” (Hall and Jones, 1999:95).
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Figure 1.1 provides a schematic model of the interactions between institutions 
and income suggested by the literature on institutions.12 This diagram explicitly 
makes the case that institutions are endogenous. First, human capital (endowment) 
is expected to be correlated with institutions and the causation goes both ways, that 
is; better institutions may provide incentives to accumulate more human capital and 
more human capital may help to create and/or develop better institutions. Social 
arrangements such as the quality of the judiciary, the strength of property right 
protection, government stability, and democracy, among other factors, can foster 
factor productivity. On the other hand, new technologies may affect the role and the 
need of institutions in a society. Therefore, the causation between factor productivity 
and institutions may also go in both directions.









12 Similar, but not identical versions of this diagram can be found in Rodrik (2003) and McArthur 
and Sachs (2001).
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Figure 1.1 also allows for a feedback effect from income on institutions. One 
could argue that as income increases, economic agents could change their pattern 
of consumption, social interaction, social needs, etc., which would then require 
changes in social arrangements and institutions. Moreover, better institutions may 
lead to large flows of trade. In addition, more openness to trade requires better 
institutional arrangements. Geography and historical facts are assumed to be deep 
determinants of both current institutions and income. Undoubtedly, this approach 
advocates that institutions must be treated as an endogenous variable. This 
proposition is consistent with Bloom etal., 1998; Gallup et al., 1999; Acemoglu etal., 
2000 and 2004; McArthur etal., 2001; and Rodrik, 2000 and 2003.
The diagram above shows the hypothesized links between institutions and 
income and allows one to specify an empirical model for the determinants of 
institutions (T). Consider the following equation:
T  = p .|+ X p 2 + P 3H + r| (1.11)
where H is an identifying variable(s), X is a matrix of geographically related 
variables, ps are parameters and q is a random error term.13
Equations 1.10 and 1.11 form a system where income level is a function of 
the institutional arrangements and geographical characteristics, which are 
considered to be deep determinants of income. A key issue in estimating this system 
of equations is the model identification, that is; can one come up with a variable (H) 
that is correlated with current institutions, but uncorrelated with current income? The 
empirical literature on institutions has proposed several different instruments to
13 Hall and Jones (1999) propose the following structural model:
y = a , + a 2T  + s
T  = Pi + P2y + Xp3 + q
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handle this problem and in general; H is associated with the historical determinants 
of institutions such as ethnolinguistic fragmentation and colonial legacy (e.g. 
colonization status and origin of the legal system).
Table B.2 reports the most influential studies that have attempted to estimate 
this model. Hall and Jones (1999) use an index of government antidiversion policies 
(GADP)14 and the extent to which a country is open to international trade as proxies 
for institution quality. In addition, they utilize absolute latitude (as a proxy for climate) 
and the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe countries are 
currently spoken as first languages as instruments for institutions. Using a sample 
with 127 countries, this study shows that good institutions lead to higher levels of per 
capita GDP. Specifically, “[differences in social infrastructure across-countries 
cause large differences in capital accumulation, educational attainment and 
productivity and therefore large differences in income across countries” (Hall and 
Jones, 1999:114).
The use of ethnolinguistic fragmentation as an instrument for institutions 
however, has been criticized in the literature. It has been argued that ethnolinguistic 
fragmentation has a direct effect on income, implying that it will not help to properly 
identify the model (Bloom et al., 1998; Gallup et at., 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2000 and 
2004; McArthur et al., 2001).
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002 and 2004) utilize settler mortality rates15 during 
the colonial period as an instrument for institutions, which are proxied by a risk of
14 The GADP is created using data from the Political Risk Service and is calculated as the 
average of five measures of perceived institutional quality [ i) law and order, ii) bureaucracy 
quality, iii) corruption, iv) risk of expropriation and v) government repudiation of contracts] for the 
years 1986 to 1995.
15 “We use data on the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops and sailors stationed in the colonies 
between the 17th and the 19th centuries” (Acemoglu et al., 2000:2).
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Expropriation Index and a Constraint on Executive index16. These authors argue that 
settler mortality rates explain the process by which early institutions were created 
because the “colonization strategy was influenced by the feasibility of settlements. In 
particular, in places where the disease environment was not favorable to European 
settlement, the cards were stacked against the creation of Neo-Europes, and the 
formation of the extractive state was more likely. ... The colonial state and 
institutions persisted even after independence” (Acemoglu et al., 2000:2). This study 
finds that three-quarters of the cross-country differences in income per capita is 
explained by differences in institutions. This study has two drawbacks. First, its 
sample is restricted to ex-colonies, so its results may not be applicable for a large 
cross-section of countries. Second, McArthur and Sachs (2001) criticize the use of 
settler mortality rates as an instrument by arguing that the burden of disease should 
be expected to have a direct effect on income rather than an indirect effect through 
institutions.
The strongest criticism of both Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2000) comes from Dollar and Kraay (2003). These authors find that the instruments 
proposed by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2000) are not robust. 
Specifically, “we find that our specification is very weakly identified in the sense that
16 Constraint on Executive measures operational (de facto) independence of the chief executive.
“This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of
chief executives. Such constraints may derive from a legislature, a mass party -  not all such
parties are wholly under control of the national leader -  or some other accountability group,
including the military." (Gurr et al., 1990). This variable rages from 1 to 7, with a higher score
indicating more constraints on the executive. Score of 1 indicates that there are no regular
limitations on executive authority (unlimited authority); score of 2 is an intermediate category; 
score of 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations on executive authority; score of 4 is an
intermediate category; score of 5 indicates that the executive has more effective authority than 
any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them (substantial limitations); 
score of 6 is an intermediate category; and score of 7 indicates that the accountability groups 
have effective authority equal to or greater than the chief executive in most areas of activity 
(executive parity or subordination). (Gurr et al., 1990).
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both sets of instruments have very strong explanatory power for both endogenous 
variables. As a result, we encounter overwhelming problems of multicollinearity in 
the second-stage regressions, which preclude the estimation of meaningful partial 
effects of either variable” (Dollar and Kraay, 2003: 135). Moreover, these authors 
find that the effect of institutions disappears when the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand are excluded from the sample. To sum up, Dollar and 
Kraay (2003) claim that the effect of institutions -  measured by six different 
indicators -  on income per capita is not robust because the positive correlation is 
mainly driven by four outliers. Dollar and Kraay (2003) suggest that one should 
carefully reinterpret previous results and search for new instruments for institutions.
1.5 Lessons from the Empirics on Institutions
Several important lessons can be drawn from this literature review. First, 
there are intrinsic difficulties in examining the impact of institutions on economic 
performance that may be difficult to overcome. It is very hard to find data that totally 
describes the nature of institutions. Subjective measures of institutions, such as 
enforcement of property rights, corruption, rule of law, democracy, civil liberty, 
economic freedom etc., have been used to conduct empirical analysis, but the 
results are highly dependent on the quality of such statistics and as shown in Tables
1.2 and 1.3, the use of different indicators may produce ambiguous predictions. 
Second, the literature review also suggests that it is difficult to provide conclusive 
empirical evidence supporting the idea that institutions matter for economic growth. 
Although several studies have attempted to demonstrate that institutions affect the 
transitional growth rate of output per capita, there is still no empirical evidence that 
supports the claim that institutions determine the steady-state growth of GDP per
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capita. Third, the survey of the literature also demonstrates the ad hoc nature of the 
econometric specifications found in the studies that evaluate the links between 
institution and economic performance. Except for making strong and general 
assumptions about the association between institutions and levels of output, these 
studies do not provide a formal theoretical rational that links institutions to output per 
capita and growth of output per capita. Moreover, the impact of institutions on 
technical innovation is typically ignored. However, as emphasized in the growth 
literature, innovation is a key mechanism for the generation of long-run economic 
growth. Hence, if one wants to both diagnostic the problem of growth and also 
search for ways to stimulate growth, it becomes very important to understand the 
links between institutions and innovation. The identification of which institutional 
arrangements are more suitable for innovation and the adoption of new technologies 
will provide valuable insights on the mechanisms of economic growth.
This study endeavors to evaluate some of the issues discussed above. For 
instance, the theoretical model developed in chapter 2 provides the foundations for 
specifying an empirical equation for innovation as well as for income, circumventing 
the need for ad hoc empirical specifications. In addition, the empirical analysis 
conducted in chapter 3 provides evidence that institutional arrangements affect a 
country’s rate of innovation, implying that institutions determine the steady state 
growth rate of output per capita. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical evidence that institutions affect the steady state growth rates of 
output.
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1.6 Modeling the Links between Institutions and Economic Growth: A Review
While neoclassical economists acknowledge that institutions are important for 
growth, they usually take institutions for granted when writing down their 
macroeconomic theories. As a consequence, the emergence of an empirical 
literature on institutions was not matched by a similar trend on the theoretical front. 
Only a few studies have incorporated institutions into the formal mainstream 
framework currently used to evaluate economic growth (e.g. Huang and Xu ,1999; 
and Gradstein, 2002 and 2004). This section discusses the challenges of writing 
down a formal model that explicitly incorporates institutions and reviews a few 
studies that have previously endeavored in this journey.
1.6.1 Challenges for Modeling the Links between Institutions and Economic Growth
Solovian Models and Endogenous Growth Models are built from the premise 
that income is determined by resource endowments (capital and human capital) and 
factor productivity (technology). Growth literature provides a large family of 
theoretical models that link physical capital, human capital and technical innovation 
to long-run growth and income levels (e.g., Solow, 1956; Romer, 1986 and 1990; 
Lucas, 1998; Grossman and Helpman (2001 [1991]), Aghion and Howitt (1992); 
Jones, 1995; Young 1998; Segerstrom 1998). Models in this tradition do not specify 
the role of institutions and geographic factors on the determination of income. In 
contrast, the literature on institutions has developed an analytical framework that 
argues that institutions are a pillar of economic growth (North and Thomas, 1973; 
Dawson, 1998; Rodrik, 2000). Therefore, ignoring the role of institutions may 
oversimplify the analysis and put out of sight important linkages in the dynamics of 
economic growth. There is still a great deal of work to be done in terms of modeling
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the association between institutions and economic performance (Sala-I-Martin, 
2002:18).
The rational behind the links between institutions and income, shown in 
Figure 1.1, is not clear and no rigorous theoretical and empirical analyses have been 
developed supporting such linkages. For instance, it could be argued that without a 
connection to technological change, institutional improvements will lead to an 
income level effect, but not to an income growth effect. Hence, a formalized model of 
the economic system may provide a much deeper understanding of the channels by 
which institutions and income are connected. However, given the complexity of the 
interactions between institutions and other components of the economic system, it is 
very difficulty to write down a mathematical model that would account for all of those 
interactions and still yield a well-behaved analytical solution. Economists, in general, 
focus the analysis on a particular set of variables or economic interactions, holding 
the other variables constant. Attempts to model institutions in a growth framework 
that follow this approach overlook much of the dynamics between institution and 
economic performance.
1.6.2 Recent Developments on Modeling Institutions
i) Financial Institutions and Growth
Huang and Xu (1999) develop a theoretical model in which financial 
institutions affect the economy’s rate of innovation. In this model, financial 
institutions help “to solve informational and incentive problems related to R&D 
activities” (p.440) and improvements in financial institutions would thus lead to higher 
rates of technical innovation and economic growth. The model assumes that a 
representative firm can produce a final good and also generate new R&D projects
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(innovation). It is assumed that the firm lacks sufficient resources to finance the 
development of new technologies (innovation), so financial institutions play a key 
role in financing ‘risky’ R&D activities. The total production of the firm is carried out 
with the following technology:
y t = [ A ( l - a t) + A a t]k t (1.12)
where A  and A  are productivity parameters of the final good and R&D sectors, 
respectively, a , is the share of investment in R&D and k is capital. The consumer 
side is modeled in terms of a representative agent who
oo
maximizes U t = E t ( ^ p s_t ln(Cs)) subject to:
S - t
Kt+1 =[0~at)(1 + r) + at0+ *t)]Kt - c t (1.13)
where Et is the expectation operator, K is the total amount of capital accumulated, r 
is the marginal product of capital, (1 + 7 ) is the expected return for each unit of 
investment in R&D and C is consumption. The solution of the model around the 
steady state is given by:
E t - ^ -  = .....E ,(% ~ r)2  + (1 + r)P (1.14)
C t (l + r)p<7t (^+i - r )
The key role of financial institutions in this model is financing R&D activities, 
which are, by nature, risky. It is assumed that financial institutions contribute to the 
project screening process by financing those projects more likely to be successful -  
or refusing to finance bad projects. This leads to a better allocation of resources in 
the R&D sector, stimulating innovation and promoting growth (Huang and Xu, 
1999:440).
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Huang and Xu (1999) show that bad projects are terminated in their first 
stages when they are multibank financed. However, bad projects may be continued 
when they are financed by a single bank. This happens because multibank financed 
projects are better screened, leads to a selection of superior projects. Therefore, an 
economy with well-developed financial institutions will tend to allocate resources for 
R&D more efficiently, leading to higher expected rates of return. Higher expected 
rates of return to R&D investments will further stimulate innovation and according to 
equation 1.14, augment economic growth (Huang and Xu, 1999:440).
Huang and Xu (1999)’s model predicts that better financial institutions will 
boost innovation and have growth effects on the economy. The model’s main 
drawback is that it defines better institutions as a function of the number of banks 
that finance the production of R&D projects. Specifically, economies whose R&D 
activities are financed by a large number of banks are classified as having better 
financial institutions than those whose R&D activities are financed by single banks. 
One could argue that Huang and Xu’s model shows that an economy whose 
financial system is more competitive tends to experience higher rates of innovation 
and economic growth. In addition, it could be also argued that this model rules out 
transactions costs and economies of scale.
ii) Institutions in Solovian-based Models
Fedderke (2001) develops a Solovian-type model in which income and 
institutions are simultaneously determined. In this model, institutions are modeled as 
a positive function of the capital stock of the economy, implying that economic 
growth leads to better institutions. The relationship between institutions and output is
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specified in several different ways. For brevity’s sake, only the general case is 
discussed here.
It is assumed that aggregate output is produced with labor and capital. The 
production technology is a CRS Cobb-Douglas production function given by:
where y is per capita income, k is the stock of capital per capita, T denotes 
institutions and 0 < a  <1. It is assumed that institutions are “determined by the per 
capita productive potential of the technology of production” (Fedderke, 2001:653), 
such that:
The model is fully specified by assuming that capital is accumulated 
according to the following rule:
where s denotes the savings rate and g is the growth rate of the labor force adjusted 
for the depreciation of capital.
This specification implies that institutions are generated as a by-product of 
capital accumulation. Under the assumption that y > 0, institutions impact the 
production function as a positive externality that increases the productivity of capital. 
This allows for increasing returns and an unbounded growth rate of output. The 
author restricts the parameters of the model and derives the steady state solution, 
which behaves much like the traditional Solow model.
y = Tk“ (1.15)
T = k“v (1.16)
where y is a free parameter. Combing equations 1.15 and 1.16 gives:
(1.17)
k = ska(1+r)_1 - g (1.18)
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The model suggests that institutions and economic performance are 
interdependent. If y > 0 economies with a large stock of capital will have better 
institutions17. In addition, better institutions lead to higher productivity and larger 
output per capita. However, when the possibility of unbounded growth is excluded, 
the model generates a steady state solution with a zero growth rate of per capita 
output and no institutional change. This model attempts to formalize the relationship 
between output and institutions, but it does not explain long-run growth and adds 
very little to our understanding of the links between institutions and technical 
innovation. Because savings is exogenously determined, capital accumulation is not 
determined inside the model implying that the development of institutions and growth 
of output are also exogenously determined.
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) develop a Solovian-type model that takes into 
account the effect of institutional factors on the provision of infrastructure. This 
model is not markedly different from the standard Solow specification, but adds, ad 
hoc, the idea that institutional factors affect negatively the return to savings, implying 
that households do not receive the full marginal benefits from their savings. 
Therefore, poor institutions reduce both the savings rate and capital accumulation, 
which ultimately, affects the provision of infrastructure and economic growth. This 
model is also not able to explain the sources that generate growth of output and 
provides no formal explanation for the links between institutions and economic 
growth.
17 Other than for modeling’s sake, the author provides no explanation supporting the statement 
that a large stock of capital causes an improvement in institutions.
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iii) Institutions in an Overlapping Generation Framework 
Gradstein (2004) models institutions in an OLG (Overlapping Generation) 
framework. This model assumes that individuals must pay the costs of financing a 
system that enforces property rights and that “property rights can be fully secured by 
incurring a cost” (Gradstein, 2004: 506). In addition, the production of property rights 
enforcement is characterized by indivisibility. The model economy takes for granted 
that income can be divided between consumption, savings and the costs of 
enforcing property rights (law and order), that is:
y it= c it+ k it+ T 8 t (1.19)
where y denotes income, c consumption, k capital, T is the costs of securing full 
protection of property rights and 8 is a indicator function, which assumes the value of 
1 if property rights are fully protected and 0 if no investment is made to guarantee 
property rights. Gradstein (2004) also assumes that technology is exogenously 
determined and the production function is characterized by diminishing returns to 
scale.
Zit+1 = Ak,“w it (1.20)
where A measures technology, w denotes labor and 0 < a  < 1.
The next period income is defined as the sum of current income plus the 
income from rent seeking:
yit+i = L tZit + ( 1 - L t)Z t+ir(uit) /  Jr(uit)di (1.21)
where 0< L < 1 denotes the level of protection of property rights, Z t+1 = Jzit+1di is 
aggregate income, u denotes time allocated for unproductive activity and 
r(ujt) /  Jr(uit)di denotes rent seeking income. Despite the dynamic setting shown in
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the form of these equations, the model is “essentially a static one” (Gradstein, 
2004:508) because the equilibrium condition is solely determined by the one-shot 
decision of the parents, who chose consumption and determine, collectively, the 
level of protection of property rights, by maximizing the following utility function:
V (c jt, y it+1) = (1 -  p) log(cit) + p log(yit+1) (1.22)
Were c is per capita consumption and y is aggregate per capita income.
The equilibrium conditions support the claim that an increase in the protection 
of property rights leads to lower current consumption and higher investment, but 
generates higher steady state levels of consumption. Moreover, the model predicts 
that optimizing agents may choose a regime of minimal protection of property rights 
in poor countries because it leads to a higher welfare level, but a regime of full 
protection will be preferable in rich countries. The model also suggests that initial 
conditions play a key role in determining steady state equilibrium, i. e., countries with 
low income and low initial level of property rights will converge to a low steady-state 
income level and low protection of property rights. However, countries with low- 
income levels, but moderate level of protection of property rights may converge to a 
high steady-state income level (Gradstein, 2004:512).
The main message of Gradstein (2004) is that the level of enforcement of 
property rights will determine the steady state level of income. However, because 
property rights levels is an endogenous variable and its enforcement requires a 
substantial amount of resources, optimizing agents who live in poor countries may 
choose to not invest the required resources in the development of a system that 
secures property rights. Moreover, full protection of property rights may only be
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feasible in rich countries because full protection is “costly and requires resources 
which only exist in sufficiently affluent economies” (Gradstein, 2004:517).
The main drawbacks of Gradstein’s model are that innovation is assumed to 
be exogenous and the links between innovation and enforcement of property rights 
are ignored. This undermines much of the model’s appeal since innovation is a key 
channel through which property rights will affect economic performance. In addition, 
the model is static and explains levels of income, but cannot explain long-run growth 
of income. Gradstein (2002) writes down an OGL model that evaluates how political 
stability affects agents’ decisions. This earlier model shows that countries that 
experience political stability will tend to have policies governed by rules, which favor 
a more equal distribution of income. This, in turn, is expected to stimulate investment 
and boost economic growth. The caveat found in Gradstein (2004) also applies to 
the Gradstein (2002) model.18
1.6.3 Lessons from Modeling Institutions
The models of growth and institutions discussed above focus the analysis on 
particular kinds of institutions and examine very specific issues. However, the 
dynamic linkages among institutions, innovation and income are not evaluated. For 
instance, unfavorable institutions (e.g. poor protection of property rights) may affect 
the returns to investment in R&D, which may discourage R&D activity and affect the 
rate of technical innovation. On the other hand, good institutions may enhance the 
diffusion of knowledge among researchers, leading to higher R&D productivity. In 
addition, the techniques of production used to produce final and intermediate goods
18 Despite the fact that Gradstein (2002) has a different focus, the model’s formal specification is 
in line with Gradstein (2004).
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may be a function of institutional arrangements. For instance, government 
regulations may require that the technology of production follow certain 
environmental ‘standards’, which may prevent a firm from using a newly invented 
non-compliant technology. This important issue is discussed in detail in chapter 2.
1.7 Conclusion
This literature review provides important insights into the empirics of 
institutions and shows that the econometric specifications used in institutions-related 
growth literature is not grounded on formal theoretical models. In addition, it also 
demonstrates that the impact of institutions on technical innovation is disregarded in 
both empirical investigations of cross-country economic performance and formal 
growth models. The review also shows that economists are still struggling with the 
problems of to incorporating institutions in formal growth models. A current important 
task for economists lies in addressing the effects of institutions on innovation. A 
major goal of this study is contributing to this research program; thus, the next 
chapter develops a growth model that examines how institutions affect technical 
innovation and economic growth. The model is built upon the premise that 
institutions influence an economy’s rate of innovation as well as the adoption of 
existing technologies. The model contributes to the literature by allowing one to 
evaluate the affects of institutions on innovation and on the transitional and steady 
state growth rates of output. In addition, the model provides the basis for specifying 
an empirical model for studying innovation, circumventing the need to rely on ad hoc 
empirical specification. Specifically, the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 
motivates the empirical analysis of the determinants of innovation that is conducted 
in chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELING INSTITUTIONS IN A GROWTH FRAMEWORK: 
A CONTRIBUTION
2.1 Introduction
Economists have become increasingly aware that institutional arrangements 
play a key role in explaining long-run economic performance (e.g. Rodrik, 2000; 
Sala-I-Martin, 2002; Gradstein, 2004). The so-called New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) literature is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework capable of explaining 
the channels by which institutional arrangements affect a country’s economic 
performance. Despite the fact that the NIE underlines the importance of institutional 
arrangements for economic performance, it has been criticized because it does not 
provide a formal framework of analysis and fails to explain how institutions are 
built.19 In addition, difficulties in introducing institutions into standard growth models 
have inhibited the development of a growth framework that explains the dynamic 
linkages between institutions and economic performance. According to Sala-I-Martin, 
“we are still in the early stages when it comes to incorporating institutions to our 
growth theories” (Sala-I-Martin, 2002:18).
A contribution of this study consists of filling this gap in the growth literature 
by constructing a formal model that examines how institutions affect technical
19 The “main weakness of the NIE as a grand theory of socio-economic development is that it is 
empty. As a critique of other theories which altogether ignore the role of institutions... it is 
welcome. But when it comes to new general insights about how determination works, the theory 
adds nothing to what we already have’’ (Toye, 1993, emphasis added).
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innovation and economic growth. It extends the Romer (1990) model by explicitly 
incorporating institutions in the productive process. This improvement allows us to 
evaluate the channels through which institutions affect technical innovation, income 
levels and income growth.
Given the complexity of the interactions between institutions and other 
components of the economic system, it is very hard to write down a mathematical 
model that accounts for all of those interactions and yet obtain a well-behaved 
analytical solution. Economists, in general, have focused their analysis on a 
particular set of variables or economic interactions, holding other variables constant. 
This study follows this methodological approach. Specifically, the links between 
institutions and technical innovation are examined assuming that population and 
human capital are exogenously determined. Moreover, the basic model overlooks 
the effects from technical innovation and human capital accumulation on the 
formation of new institutions (Figure 2.1 shows a schematic model economy). This 
assumption is relaxed afterwards and its implications evaluated. While this approach 
simplifies the problem at hand, it may shed light on the channels by which 
institutions affect technical innovation and consequently, economic growth.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
theoretical model. The model is built upon a set of assumptions that shape the links 
between institutions, innovation and the adoption of new technologies in the 
productive process. Section 3 uses comparative statics to evaluate the impact of 
human capital accumulation on economic performance. Section 4 models the links 
between institutions and human capital. Section 5 discusses the implications of the 
model. Section 6 presents the chapter’s conclusions.
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f p h y s ic a lC a p ita l l
Figure 2.1 -  A Schematic Model Economy
- t





The model economy has the structure used by Romer (1990). The economy 
has three sectors. One sector produces a final good using human capital, physical 
capital and a weighted aggregate measure of intermediate inputs. A second sector 
produces intermediate inputs using forgone consumption and the projects 
(knowledge) developed in the third sector, which conducts R&D. The complete 
specification of each of these sectors is fully discussed below. For simplicity’s sake, 
it is assumed that population and human capital are constant20.
i) Final Good Sector
The firm that produces the final good utilizes a constant-returns-to-scale 
(CRS) technology and operates in a market characterized by perfect competition. 
Output is produced using the following production function:
20 Marinho, Ataliba and Tebaldi (2003) extend the Romer model by allowing, among other 
changes, that population and human capital are not constant. This greatly complicates the 
analysis of the model’s dynamics.
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Y  = K ^ H P  _[f(AJ) x(i)“ di (2.1)
where K is the stock of physical capital, H Y is human capital employed in the 
manufacturing sector, x(i) denotes intermediate inputs, A denotes knowledge, T 
denotes institutions, i indexes the variety of intermediate inputs, 0 < a  < 1, 0 < (3 < 1, 
P + a  < 1 and f  is a function whose functional form is discussed below27.
A is measured by the number of intermediate inputs already invented and 
available for use at any time with x(i)=0 for all i > A. Moreover, A only increases if a 
newly invented intermediate input is superior in productivity compared to the existing 
intermediate inputs. T is a measure of institutional arrangements and refers to a set 
of elements related to the way that a society and its economy operates in modern 
capitalist countries. More precisely, T is a hypothetical variable that accounts for the 
enforcement of contracts and property rights, perceptions that the judiciary system is 
predictable and effective, transparency of the public administration, control of 
corruption and pro-market regulations (e.g., no price controls). In other words, this 
model treats institutions, T, as a set of growth-promoting attributes. In addition, T is 
assumed to be increasing with the quality of institutions, i.e., the better the 
institutions, the bigger T. This may seem to be a too narrow characterization of 
institutions. However, this formulation is only for conceptual purposes and serves the 
positive purpose of describing the evolution of a complex variable. More specifically, 
an increase in T does not imply that a society is changing all of its institutions (or 
fundamental institutional principles). This only indicates that a society has a certain
21 See Table C.1 in Appendix C for a list of variable's definitions used in this chapter. Also, notice 
that the argument time (t) is suppressed in all equations.
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degree of freedom to make institutional changes compatible to growth-promoting 
objectives.22
Equation 2.1 has several features not found in Romer (1990). First, Romer's 
model hypothesizes that all newly invented technologies can be instantaneously 
used in the productive process. Instead, the specification here expands on Romer’s 
analysis by modeling potential institutional barriers to the adoption of new 
technologies into the productive process. This improvement allows one to evaluate 
the influences of barriers to the adoption of new technologies on both levels and 
growth rates of output. Second, Romer (1990) assumes that the parameters of 
physical capital and of the variety of intermediate inputs are equal. This study 
relaxes this assumption by allowing different productivity parameters for physical 
capital and the for variety of intermediate inputs, x. The logic behind this formulation 
is that the degree of substitutability and complementarity between the stock of 
physical capital and the variety of intermediate inputs are differentiated. The impact 
on output from an increase of one unit of a specific intermediate input may be 
different from the impact on output due to an increase of one unit in the aggregate 
stock of capital. This approach is consistent with Grossman and Helpman (2001). 
Third, Romer (1990) specifies the production function in terms of the variety of 
intermediate inputs, but overlooks the overall affect of the stock of physical capital on 
production. This study specifies the production function as a function of both the 
stock of physical capital and the various types of capital goods that are produced by
22 Issues related to moral, values and ethics are beyond the scope of this study. For instance, a 
society may choose to have growth hindering institutions because of its moral values. This model 
does not discuss whether this is wrong or right. It only says what the opportunity costs of making 
such decision are. For instance, a society may choose to not engage in any rent-seeking 
transactions because of beliefs that this is not morally right. Suppose that as a result this society 
experiences slower output growth rates. In this case, lower output growth rates are the 
opportunity cost of choosing to not engage in rent-seeking operations.
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an economy. Therefore, equation 2.1 incorporates features that allow for a richer 
analysis of an economy.
ii) Modeling the Institutional Barriers for Adopting New Technologies
In a competitive market, firms are willing to use all intermediate inputs already 
invented and available if the cost of buying that input is equal to its marginal product. 
However, firms may face various problems in their decision to adopt productivity- 
increasing technology. Specifically, organizational problems and institutional-related 
constraints, such as labor market imperfections (e.g. restrictive labor contracts or a 
union’s bargaining power) and government regulations may hold back the 
introduction of newly invented technologies in the production process (Baldwin and 
Lin, 2002, Haucap and Wey, 2004). In other words, institutional constraints may 
prevent firms from operating on the production possibility frontier -P P F .23
Figure 2.2 illustrates the case where an economy - that produces two goods -  
originally was operating at point B. Technology improves from A to A’, which shifts 
the PPF rightwards. Without constraints, the economy would operate at point D, but 
it may end up operating at point C due to institutional arrangements constraining the 
adoption of the new technology. In this case, poor institutions affect adversely the 
marginal product of the input newly invented. In specific situations, a new technology 
may be available, but firms would not be able to use it in the productive process 
because of a restrictive regulation, which leads the marginal product of that 
intermediate input to become zero. In such a case, the demand for such an 
intermediate input would be zero for any price greater than zero.
23 More details and examples on this point are presented in Box 1.
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A suitably chosen f  function may communicate these ideas mathematically. A 
particular functional form is considered in here:
where y  > 0 is a scale adjusting parameter that accounts for the influence of 
institutions on the adoption of new technologies and vj/ can be interpreted as a 
measure of the importance of institutional arrangements for the adoption of new 
technologies.
Equation 2.2, therefore, assumes that either technological improvements (A) 
or Institutions (T), but not both, have marginal effects on output. The logic behind 
this formulation is that an economy may face institutional constraints to the adoption 
of new technologies in the productive process. In this case, only improvements in 
institutions (T) will allow the economy to incorporate newly invented inputs in the
(2 .2)
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production process. The assumptions below shape the final specification of the 
production function.
Assumption a: New technologies change the production modes and ultimately, 
require new institutional arrangements to allow the economy to 
operate at the production possibility frontier.
Assumption b: In the long run, the rate of innovation (production of new intermediate 
inputs) is at most equal to the rate in which institutions change.
Assumption a recognizes that “institutions need continual adaptation in face 
of a changing environment of technology” (Matthews, 1986:908). Without changes in 
current institutions, the economy cannot fully exploit the efficiency gains from current 
innovation and so “institutional change is a necessary part of economic growth” 
(Matthews, 1986:908). Assumption b implies that an economy cannot innovate 
indefinitely without adapting its institutions to the new technologies.
Under these assumptions, an economy may not be able to utilize available 
new technologies due to institutional barriers. Mathematically, we represent this case 
by setting A > yT, so the production function becomes
This specification seems reasonable and may be corroborated by real world 
events. Specifically, one could utilize case studies associated with institutional- 
related constraints on the adoption of new technologies to support this specification. 
While this study does not intend to pursue a detailed discussion of this issue, a 
couple of examples are briefly discussed in boxes 1 and 2 and a more detailed 
discussion is presented in this chapter’s appendix .
(2.3)
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Box 1: Institutional Constraints for the Adoption of New 
Technologies: The Case of Labor Market Imperfection
Labor market imperfection is an example of institutional arrangements that 
constrain the adoption of new technologies. For instance, it has been argued that 
unionization structure can influence firms’ decisions concerning the adoption of 
labor-saving technologies. Specifically, firms operating under strong union 
bargaining power may be prevented from adopting technologies that reduce the 
demand for unskilled labor, but increase overall productivity (Baldwin and Lin, 
2002; Haucap and Wey, 2004). A case study of the Canadian manufacturing 
industry, by Baldwin and Lin (2002), finds a significant association between 
unionization and impediments for the adoption of new technologies*. Specifically, 
a “plant that reports its employees are covered by a collective agreement 
[unionized] increases its probability of reporting impediments [to adopt new 
technologies] in each of these areas [labor and organizational impediments] by 
about 3 to 5 percentage points” (Baldwin and Lin, 2002:15). Therefore, labor 
market imperfections may hamper the adoption of new technologies in countries 
with restrictive regulations in their labor markets.
Despite the fact that these examples do not prove the hypothesis that 
institutional arrangements hinder the adoption of new technologies, they do 
suggest that this assumption is reasonable and should be considered as part of 
the modeling of technical innovation in an economic growth model.
* The studies cited above do not consider the role of unions as an agent that battles for equity 
and workers’ rights. While important, these issues are not the focus of this study.
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Box 2: Institutional Constraints for the Adoption of New 
Technologies: The Case of Genetically Modified Crops
One can easily make the case that government regulations prevent the 
use, production and commercialization of genetically modified crops; a 
productivity-increasing technology*. Consider the following facts: i) there is a 
noticeable concentration of the production of transgenic crops in a few countries 
(James, 2004)** and ii) transgenic seeds have been widely available for 
commercialization since 1996 (James and Krattigger, 1996).
It appears that institutional arrangements can explain much of this 
observable fact. First, innovating countries may be afraid of delivering new 
technologies to countries with a poor system of property rights protection 
(Krattiger, 1997). In this case, institutionally backward countries are not able to 
learn and adapt the new technologies because they have no access to the 
technology needed to manipulate the genetically altered seeds. This may lessen 
the benefits of using transgenic seeds in institutionally backward countries. 
However, these countries would still be able to buy transgenic seeds from the 
leading innovating countries. Second, biosafety regulatory laws impose strong 
constraints on the implementation of the production and commercialization of 
genetically altered seeds in many countries around the world (Krattiger, 1997, 
James, 2004). Appendix B discusses this issue in detail and provides a brief 
study of the Brazilian regulatory constraints on the adoption of genetically 
modified crops.
* As discussed before, this study is focused on growth-promoting mechanisms. Issues related 
to morals, values and ethics are beyond the scope of this study.
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iii) Intermediate sector
A key feature of endogenous growth models is that they allow for imperfect 
competition in the intermediate sector, which makes the market structure relatively 
complex and constrains the researcher to model this sector in terms of a 
representative firm. In this study, it is assumed that there is a distinct producer for 
each input i, who must buy the patent of that input from a R&D producer. Models in 
the Romer (1990) tradition assume that the intermediate inputs can be produced 
using the same technology utilized to produce the final good, where consumption is 
forgone (in the form of capital) in order to produce the intermediate inputs. For 
simplicity, it is assumed here that each unit of consumption forgone can generate 
one unit of capital that can be used in the production of intermediate inputs24. The 
fact that there is only one producer of input i implies that there is only one seller of 
input i, who will face a downward sloping demand curve. One can derive the inverse 
demand function for a specific input from the profit optimality conditions of the 
producer of final good. The inverse demand function for input is given by:
Pi =  a K 1~a- pH pYXja- 1 <2 -4 )
The producer of intermediate inputs faces an opportunity cost of capital equal 
to the interest rate (r). In addition, the cost of buying a patent is fixed and so it can be 
omitted from the profit function of the producer of input i, so that:
7t(i) = p (i)x(i)-rx(i) (2.5)
Substituting equation 2.4 into equation 2.5 gives: 
ir(i) = a K 1-a~pH^x(i)a -rx (i)
The first order condition generates:
24 Romer (1990:S81) provides a detailed discussion about this specification.
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W e can use the first order conditions to manipulate equation 2.5 and obtain:
price of the intermediate inputs are identical for all /'. This result implies that the 
producer of the final good will demand an identical amount of each intermediate 
input /, that is, x(i)=x.
A potential new producer of an intermediate input decides to enter in the 
market by comparing the discounted stream of profit generated by producing that 
input and the price that must be paid for the patent. If the price of a patent (new 
design) is determined in a perfectly competitive market then its price (PA) will be 
equal to the present discounted stream of profit that the producer of intermediate 
inputs could make producing the intermediate input i. Formally,
This equation can be written as n = rPA . This shows that the profit rate of the 
producer of intermediate goods is equal to the discounted price of innovation, which 
is equivalent to the present value of the innovation costs.
iv) The R&D Sector
The new growth theory a-la-Romer assumes that innovation results from 




Substituting equation 2.6 into equation 2.4 generates p(i) = p = — , that is; the
a
(2.8)
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such a way that profit is maximized. Moreover, new growth theory suggests that 
innovation depends primarily on personnel engaged in R&D and the existing 
knowledge (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 2001 
[1991]; and Jones (1995)). Models developed in this tradition completely ignore the 
role of institutions in the innovation process. Despite the fact that institutions are not 
explicitly present in growth models, economists in this field readily accept the idea 
that institutions are an important input for innovation. For instance, Sala-I-Martin 
(2002) argues that “it is hard to come up with new and better technologies if an 
economy does not have the right institutions” (p.18).
Freeman (1987) argues that institutions are a key component in the process 
of creating and diffusing new technologies. According to him, when firms are left on 
their own, they engage in myopic innovative processes that will lead to profit 
maximization in the short-run, but would not maximize long-run profits. In other 
words, one could argue that some institutions create incentives for firms to focus 
only on the short-run. Therefore, suitable macro-institutions may provide proper 
incentives for innovation by changing firms’ myopic behavior in the short-run, leading 
firms to engage in innovative processes that would ensure long-term profitability25.
Lundvall (1992) states that innovation is not a deterministic process and 
“together the economic structure and the institutional set-up form the framework for 
and strongly affect, processes of interactive learning, sometimes resulting in 
innovations” (Lundvall, 1992:12). In agreement with this argument, Matthews (1986) 
points out that better institutional arrangements enable economic agents “to co­
operate with one another more efficiently” (p.908) thus stimulating innovation. These
25 Freeman applies these ideas to analyze Japan’s innovation system.
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ideas are incorporated into a standard growth framework of innovation by explicitly 
modeling institutions as part of the innovation process. This study assumes that:
Assumption c: Institutional capital directly affects the innovation process;
Assumption d: Improvement in technology changes production modes and increases 
the complexity of social relationships. On average, this causes 
existing institutions to become relatively obsolete and changes the 
institutional structure needed to produce new technologies26.
These assumptions are included in the model in the following way; a variable 
that accounts for institutional capital enters directly into the production function of 
new ideas, but not as a choice variable. Therefore, R&D firms make decisions on the 
demand for human capital taking institutions for granted. Consider the equation27:
A = 8AHaZ (A ,T ) (2-9)
where A measures technical knowledge , HA is human capital engaged in R&D (it is 
the only choice variable in the R&D sector), Z denotes the institutional structure 
controlling for the level of technology and 0 < a < 1. It is assumed that Z increases
5Z
as the institutional arrangements (T) improve ( —  = Z T > 0 ) .  Furthermore, the
8T
assumption that improvements in technology make existing institutions relatively
26 “As circumstances change due to improvements in technology ..., social beliefs [consumers, 
firms and government] will be altered which require modifications of the institutional structure” 
(Atkinson, 1998:35-36).
“.... [Institutions need continual adaptation in face of a changing environment of technology and 
tastes” (Matthews, 1986:908).
27 This specification overlooks the influences of physical capital on knowledge production. The 
rationality supporting this formulation is the idea that knowledge production is more human capital 
intensive.
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obsolete implies that —  = Z A < 0 . To make this specification workable, Z is defined
<9A
asZ = T /A  .28Accordingly, the production function of new technologies is given by:
A = 8A1“aH AT a (2.10)
The logic behind this formulation is that institutions are a necessary input for
the production of new R&D projects. Good institutions help in the process of
registering new patents, diffusion of ideas across researchers, diffusion of current 
knowledge, enforcement of property rights and reduce the uncertainty of new 
projects; all factors that stimulate R&D activities.
It is worth noticing that this model of innovation departs greatly from Romer 
(1990). More precisely, Romer’s model represents a special case where a=0. In this 
case, the model implies that doubling the number of workers devoted to R&D will 
double the growth rate of knowledge. In the steady state, the growth rate of output 
per capita is equal to the growth rate of knowledge and the scale effect from the 
R&D sector extends to output per capita, i.e., doubling the number of workers 
devoted to R&D doubles the growth rate of per capita output. Jones (1995) shows 
that such an implication is not consistent with the empirical record and can be easily 
falsified. Jones (1995) suggests an alternative specification in which the discovery of 
new ideas becomes more difficult as the stock of knowledge increases, i.e., “the 
probability that a person engaged in R&D discovers a new idea is decreasing in the 
level of knowledge” (Jones, 1995:765).
28 This functional form is very strict. Future research might improve upon this by allowing a more 
flexible specification.
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Because this model does not predict scale effects29, Jones’ critique does not 
apply to the model developed here. Moreover, the model developed here improves 
Jones’s specification because it provides a rationality for how the discovery of new 
ideas becomes more difficult as the stock of knowledge increases. Additionally, it 
accounts for the direct effect of institutions on the innovation process, a dynamic 
ignored by Jones. This development allows one to evaluate the channels through 
which institutions affect technical innovation. Moreover, building a formal framework 
of analysis upon the existing literature may stimulate insightful and inspiring debates 
and lead to testable implications on the role of institutions in the productive process.
v) Equilibrium in the Labor Market
The model assumes a competitive labor market with human capital perfectly 
mobile across the final good sector and the R&D sector. In equilibrium wages are 
equalized across sectors, so WY = WA , where W Y and W A are the wages in the final 
good sector and R&D sector, respectively. Using the results from the previous 
section and calculating the marginal product of human capital from equation 2.3 
gives:
W Y = pK1- a- pHpY- V T x “ . (2 .11)
The R&D producer is willing to hire more workers as long as the wage is less 
than or equal to its marginal product. Consider the profit function:
Max 7iA = PA A -  W aHa = PA5A1~aH AT a -  W AH A
h a
29 Specifically, in this model an increase in the human capital allocated in the R&D sector (HA) 
has no impact on the steady state growth rate of technical progress.
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first order condition generates WA = PaSA1 aT a . Substituting equation 
2.8 into this equation gives:
W A = y  5A1~aT a (2.12)
The equilibrium condition, W A=WY, generates:
- 6 A 1"aT a = pK1- “- pHP_ V T x a 
r
Substituting equation 2.7 into this equation gives:
^ ^ x 5 A 1"aTa = pK1~a-pHPrVTxa 
a
Substituting equation 2.6 into this equation and solving it for HY produces: 
H Y = X Z i - r (2.13)
where A = — — —  > 0. Define:
Ba - ^ - « H aZ* <2 1 4 >
UsingHA = H - H Y , equation 2.13 can be rewritten as follows:
Ha = H -  — Z 1_ar 
A A8
Substituting equation 2.14 into this equation gives:
gA = S H Z * - ^ Z r  (2.15)
The behavior of wages in the labor market determines the equilibrium 
conditions from the supply side of the economy. Therefore, equation 2.15 denotes a 
supply side equilibrium growth rate of technology. However, it is not a general
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equilibrium condition because it does not take into account the effects of the demand 
side of the economy.
vi) The Consumers
The demand side is modeled in terms of a representative agent. For 
simplicity’s sake, the population is normalized to 1 and the utility function is assumed 
to have a logarithmic form30. The representative agent maximizes an infinite stream 
of consumption subject to the following constraints:
c) HA + H Y < H
The easiest way to solve this optimization problem is to construct a current- 
value Hamiltonian:
The solution to this Hamiltonian is well-know and produces the famous Euler
Equation:
•
C—- = r - p  
C
where p is the intertemporal discount rate. This model generates a well-behaved 
steady state solution where output, consumption and capital grow at the same rate
a) K  = Y - C
b) A = SA1~aHAT a
Hc = ln(C)) + ^ ( Y - C )  + A,28A1~aHAT a
Y  = C = K 
Y ~ C  ~ K
. Log-differentiating equation 2.3 and and the Euler
equation give:
30 U(C) = ln(C ).
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vii) General Equilibrium
By definition, the growth rate of innovation must be constant in the steady 
state. Using this fact and log-differentiating equation 2.10 produces:
gT = gA = g
Solving equation 2.15 for r and substituting the solution into equation 2.17
gives:
§HZa - ^ Z  6HZa"1- ^
g = ----------------—  = ----------- =— —  (2.18)
4 V -7  -7 - 1  V1 + .... - ....... z  z  + — - —
(a  +  p)A (a  +  P)A
Equation 2.18 takes into account both supply and demand forces and 
denotes the general equilibrium growth rate of the economy. Because it makes no 
sense to have an equilibrium growth rate of output negative, it is assumed that g is
nonnegative, i.e. H  > ^ E z 1_a. It is worth noticing that the model is derived assuming
A5
that institutional arrangements bind the adoption of new technologies (A > vj/T). 
Given that A and T are nonnegative, Z must also be nonnegative (Z=(T/A) > 0).
These conditions imply that 0 < \j/Z < 1. This inequality is useful for evaluating the
steady-state growth rate of output of two limiting cases:
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i) T 'Z  -»  0: Institutions bind the adoption of any technology. Under this 
assumption, the steady-state growth rate of output is given by:
lim g
\j/Z -»  0
lim
vj/Z -> 0




(a  +  P)A
M/Z
ii) v|/Z—>1: institutions do not bind the adoption of technology and all old 
and newly invented intermediate inputs may be utilized in the 
productive process. In this case,
lim g 
vj/Z ->  1
lim
\|/Z —> 1




(a  +  P)A
M/Z 1 +
1
(a  +  p)A
>0
The model suggests that institutional impediments to the adoption of new 
technologies decrease the steady state growth rate of output. On the other hand, 
better institutions increase the steady growth rate of output. The impact of the 
improvement of institutions on the steady state of growth rate of output is augmented 
when an economy has a relatively large stock of human capital. The results above, 
therefore, allow one to state the following result:





An interesting result can be obtained by evaluating the following situation: 
Consider a small country31 that faces a world with perfect and instantaneous 
diffusion of knowledge, such that A is identical for all countries. In other words, this
31 A country is small in the sense that its knowledge production does not affect the world 
knowledge frontier.
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country may potentially utilize all of the available technology in the world. Under 
these conditions and controlling for other determinants of income, a country with 
poor institutions will lag behind countries with good institutions in terms of growth of 
output and this gap will grow over time, implying that income convergence is ruled 
out. Therefore, convergence in terms of income is precluded if institutional 
convergence does not occur first.
Proposition 2: Controlling for diffusion of technology and other determinants of 
income, a country with a lower level of income and poor institutional 
arrangements will not converge to the levels of income extant in countries with 
better institutions.
The next sections further discuss the implications of the model.
2.3 Influences of Changes in Human Capital on Growth of Output
i) Institutions Bind the Adoption of New Technologies ( A > \|/T )
Suppose that an economy is operating at its steady state and at time tk, the 
stock of human capital increases from H0 to H-i once-for-all. Because equation 2.18 
holds at the impact change and Z is allowed to change over time but is constant at a 
point in time, the growth rate of the economy must shift up to gi from g0. 
Consequently, an increase in H will boost the short-run growth rate of output. 
However, the steady state growth rate of output also depends on the dynamics of Z. 
Because equilibrium in the labor market requires that new human capital will not be 
allocated in just one sector, both Hy and HA will increase. According to equation 
2.14, at the impact change, an increase in H will cause A to grow faster than T32.
32 Before the change in H, T and A were growing at the same rate (see the model's solution for 
details).
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This implies that Z will decrease over time (Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of both A 
and Z). Equation 2.14 shows that a decreasing Z slows down the growth of new 
technologies. Z only stops shrinking when the economy returns to its long-run path 
of growth, where A and T grow at the same rate (g).
Figure 2.3: Impact of an Increase in H on the Time Paths of A and Z
ln(A) f
The rationality behind these results is as follows: an increase in human 
capital enhances innovation in the short-run, increasing the production of new 
technologies. However, new technologies change the production modes and
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increase the complexity of the social relationships, making the existing institutional 
structure to become relatively obsolete. In turn, this slows down the innovation rate 
(gA) and consequently slows down the growth rate of output. The economy will reach 
its steady state as soon as the growth rate of A equals the growth rate of T, when Z 
stops shrinking. Because the growth of output is driven by the growth rate of 
technology and institutions, this result implies that an increase in H will not affect the 
long-run growth rate of output. Therefore, a one-time increase in the stock of human 
capital positively affects the short-run growth of output, but has no effect on the 
steady state growth rate of the economy. Human capital will affect the long-run 
growth rate of the economy only if it continually increases over time.
Proposition 3: An increase in the stock of human capital will increase the 
growth rate of output in the short-run, but this effect disappears in the long- 
run as the growth rate of output returns to its steady-state growth path, which 
is equal to the growth rate of innovation (or the growth rate of institutions).
Changes in H will affect the steady state levels of output. Solving equation 
2.15 for g and substituting the solution into equation 2.17 gives:
5ZaH + p(P + cc)
= (P + a ) + ^ Z  <Z 1 9 >
A
Since Z is constant at any point in time, an increase in H will lead to an 
increase in r in the short-run. An increase in r, according to equation 2.13, will cause 
the final goods sector to increase the demand for HY. Consequently, the level of 
output increases above its original long-run trend, as shown in figure 2.4. However,
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the results also imply that output will return to its long-run trajectory, growing at a 
rate of g. Therefore, a change in H has a permanent effect on levels of output,
Figure 2.4: Impact on Levels of Output
tk t
To sum up, the model predicts that a rise in the stock of human capital 
increases the level of output, but has no steady state output growth effects. Only 
sustainable growth in human capital will generate steady state growth effects.
Proposition 4: the stock of human capital should not be associated with the 
growth rate of output; instead, the growth rate of human capital should be 
associated with the growth rate of output
ii) Institutions do not Bind the Adoption of New Technologies ( A < i|/T )
The model developed in previous sections is suitable for evaluating the case 
when A > \ ( / T .  The model needs to be solved again to analyze a situation 
whereA<\ j /T .  To save space, only the key equilibrium conditions are reported
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below for the case when A<v| /T.  Specifically, equations 2.13, 2.18 and the 
equilibrium interest rate are now given by:
■ I V  rHy=^ F (2 ' 13A)
5 Z aH - ( ¥ p / A )
1 , ¥  (2.18 A)
A (a  +  P)
5 Z aH +  p(P + a )
(2.19A)
(P +  CC) H-----
A
r =
This case is not markedly different from the one discussed above. First, an 
increase in H will cause a discontinuous jump in the growth rate of the economy, g. 
However, the productivity gains in terms of innovation and the consequent 
expansion of the innovation rate is offset by the inability of the society to adapt its 
institutions quickly enough to the satisfy the requirements of the new technologies. 
This decelerates the growth rate of innovation as well as the growth rate of output, 
bringing the economy back toward its original steady state path. However, an 
increase in H leads to an increase in r, which causes an increase in the demand for 
Hy, permanently augmenting the level of output. While these results are identical to 
the ones found under the assumption that A > \ | / T ,  it is worth noticing that the 
impact effect on g is greater when institutions are not binding on the utilization of 
new technologies, that is:33
33 The assumption that in the long-run the rate of innovation is at most equal to the rate of 
change in institutions implies thatZ > 1. Therefore, under this assumption the impact effect from
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dg 8Za ^ dg 8Za
y Z^  A<yT <j +  V ____
(a  +  P)A (a  +  p)A
Therefore, the model predicts that a country with no institutional restrictions 
for the adoption of new technologies will grow faster than a country with such 
impediments. Moreover, the better the institutional arrangements, controlling for 
technology (i.e., larger Z), the greater the impact on growth and levels of output from 
a change in human capital.
This finding suggests that the return to policies aimed at improving the skills 
of the labor force is lowered when a country’s institutional arrangements constrain 
the utilization of new technologies. In addition, under an endogenous process of 
human capital accumulation, individuals may choose to accumulate less human 
capital due to the differential in returns to investment in such skills.
2.4 Modeling the Links between Institutions and Human Capital
The model economy discussed above assumes that institutional changes are 
exogenously determined. While this assumption simplifies the model and allows one 
to obtain a well-behaved analytical solution, relaxing this assumption may provide 
valuable information on the mechanisms of economic growth. Given the fact that the 
growth literature emphasizes the importance of human capital accumulation for 
economic growth (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990), we relax the assumption of 
exogenous generated institutional changes by allowing human capital and 
institutional changes to interact. Specifically, we incorporate the idea that current 
institutions depend on human capital accumulation. Consider the following equation:
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T(t) =  x f HCsJe^ds (2,20)
where % > 0 accounts for all exogenous determinants of institutions other than 
human capital(H) and r\ weights the impact of human capital and other ‘exogenous 
determinants of institutions’ (x) on current institutions34.
The form of this equation has a long history in economic thought. Rosenberg 
(1963) explains Bernard Mandeville (early 1700)’s ideas on the development of good 
institutions as an evolutionary process dependent on generations of accumulated 
knowledge. “Human institutions are not to be regarded as the product of human 
ingenuity, much less the result of a single mind. They are, rather, the fruits of a long 
gradual growth process. The results of this evolution are not only contrivances 
beyond the ingenuity of individuals; once they have evolved, they multiple manifold 
the otherwise crude and limited abilities of the individual human agent... [Institutions] 
are the product, not of inspiration (either human or divine) but of the collective
experience of the human race” (Rosenberg, 186-87) or T (t) =  x f  H ^ J e ^ d s .
This equation implies that the current institutional arrangement is a function of 
current and past human capital stocks, colonial legacy and geography. For 
simplicity’s sake, assume that the stock of human capital is constant over time, that 
is, H(t)=H0, so equation 2.20 can be easily solved:
34 To conform to the literature (e.g. La Porta et at., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2004), x can 
be specified as a function of geographically related variables and the colonial legacy (e.g. origin 
of the legal system, colonization type, etc).
(2 .21)
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Equation 2.21 captures the idea that initial conditions are important for 
explaining the current state of institutions. First, the ‘other’ exogenous determinants 
of institutions (x) accounts for the historical factors that may have had influence on 
current institutions. In addition, by controlling for ‘other’ exogenous determinants of 
institutions (x), this equation states that a country that started with a larger stock of 
human capital would be able to develop better ’early’ institutional arrangements, 
which ultimately reflects in the quality of current institutions because of the 
persistence effect. The persistence effect is the idea that once institutions are built, 
economic and political mechanisms generated as a byproduct of those institutions 
will set constraints on future institutional changes and those early institutional 
arrangements will persist over time (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; La Porta, et al., 
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2000).35
Equation 2.22 implies that the growth rate of institutions depends on the 
weight that historical determinants and previously accumulated human capital have 
in determining current institutions. Specifically, a larger q will lead to a greater impact 
of the historical legacy on current institutions. For instance, a large rj implies that a 
country's initial stock of human capital would have a significant impact on current 
institutions. Therefore, this model makes the case that the growth rate of current 
institutions depends on the weight that historical determinants and previously 
accumulated human capital have on current institutions.
35 For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Acemoglu et al. (2000).
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While this formulation is simplistic and ignores much of the dynamics 
between institutional change and human capital accumulation, it allows us to 
evaluate the effects of a change on human capital accumulation patterns on both 
institutions and economic growth. For instance, consider the case where institutions 
bind the adoption of new technologies (i.e., A> i | / T ) .  The impact of a once-for-all 
increase in H at time tk on the time paths of g and Z is similar to that found in the 
previous sections. According to equations 2.21 and 2.22, an increase in the stock of 
human capital from Hi to H2, at time tk will discontinuously shift the level of 
institutions (see Figure 2.3), but will have no effect on the growth rate of institutions. 
Because the growth rate of institutions is the deepest determinant of the growth rate 
of output, a once-and-for-all increase in H will have no long-run effect on the growth 
rate of output. Therefore, incorporating the idea that human capital is positively 
related to institutional changes does not affect the main result found in the previous 
sections that discrete changes in the stock of human capital will affect the short-run 
run growth of output, but have no steady state effect on growth. Only a sustainable 
increase in the stock of human capital will affect the steady state growth rate of 
output.
2.5. Discussion
The analysis above shows that the long-run growth of the economy is 
intrinsically linked to the growth rate of institutions. This is a direct implication of the 
specification of the knowledge production function because high-quality institutions 
boost innovation, but innovation changes the institutional arrangements necessary
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for keeping the growth rate of innovation constant, that is; innovation causes current 
institutions to become obsolete.






The implications of the assumption that institutional arrangements bind, the 
utilization of new technologies are not straightforward. The model suggests that this 
assumption will not affect the long-run growth of the economy. In either case, 
whether institutions bind or whether institutions do not bind the adoption of 
technologies, the long-run growth of output is determined by the long-run growth rate 
of innovation, which is equal to the growth rate of institutions. However, the short-run 
growth rate of the economy as well as the level of output are affected only if 
institutional arrangements constrain the adoption of new technologies. In the short- 
run, an economy whose institutional arrangements are not changing at the rate 
needed to follow the path of technological change will experience a slowdown in its
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rate of innovation and consequently a slowdown in its growth rate of output. In 
addition, the lack of proper institutions will retard or prevent the utilization of newly 
invented inputs in the productive process, leading to relatively lower levels of output. 
Therefore, controlling for all other determinants of income, countries or regions that 
experience institutional constraints on the adoption of newly invented technologies 
are expected to have lower levels of output compared to countries where institutions 
do not constrain the adoption of new technologies.
The model also predicts that human capital is an important determinant of 
both institutions and output. Despite the fact that human capital does not affect the 
long-run growth rate of the economy, it directly influences the level of output. 
Therefore, differences in the stock of human capital are expected to explain income 
level differentials across countries, but not growth differentials across countries. This 
is broadly consistent with the predictions of the Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988) and 
Jones (1995) theoretical models, which suggest that the growth rate of output is 
proportional to the growth rate of human capital. However, it contradicts the 
predictions of the Romer (1990) and Rebelo (1991) models, which suggest that the 
level of human capital is associated with the growth rate of the economy.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates the influence of institutions on economic performance 
by extending a standard growth model. Specifically, this chapter presents a formal 
model that explicitly examines how institutions affect technical innovation and 
economic growth. While the model is simplistic, makes strong assumptions about the 
way that an economy works and certainly is not a complete theory of growth and 
institutions, it is important because it contributes to fill a gap in the growth literature
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and provides valuable insights concerning the dynamics and the interactions among 
institutions, innovation, income levels and income growth.
A major prediction of the theoretical model is that innovation depends on a 
country’s ability to improve its institutional arrangements as new technologies 
become available. The logic behind this is that innovation may change the society’s 
production structure, causing current institutions to become relatively obsolete. In 
addition, the model posits that the long-run growth rate of output is determined by 
the growth rate of innovation, which is ultimately a function of a society’s institutions. 
Therefore, a testable implication of this model is that better institutional 
arrangements boost innovation and thus economic growth.
The model also makes the case that the lack of proper institutions will retard 
or prevent the utilization of newly invented inputs in the productive process, leading 
to relatively lower levels of output. Therefore, controlling for all other determinants of 
income, countries or regions that experience institutional constraints on the adoption 
of newly invented technologies will be expected to lag behind in terms of growth and 
levels of output per capita and this gap will not vanish over time.
The model also supports the argument that human capital is an important 
input for shaping institutions and promoting innovation. However, it suggests that 
human capital has no growth effect, that is; an increase in the stock of human capital 
will not affect the long-run growth rate of the economy. Only sustainable growth in 
human capital generates growth effects in output. In other words, this model predicts 
that in the steady state the stock of human capital should not be associated with the 
growth rate of output; rather the growth rate of human capital should be associated 
with the growth rate of output.
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CHAPTER 3
INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONS: 
AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an econometric model for technical innovation derived 
from the theoretical model developed in chapter 2, which gives simple testable 
predictions about how institutions influence technical innovation. Specifically, I test 
the prediction that institutions boost technical innovation (patent production) and also 
assess how different kinds of institutions (Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, 
Regulatory Quality and Risk of Expropriation) affect the production of patents. The 
empirical strategy consists of using cross-country data and the instrumental variable 
approach in order to investigate these questions.
The publication of the breakthrough paper of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
and the availability of datasets on institutional quality36 greatly contributed to the 
opening of a new front of empirical research aimed at evaluating the influences of 
institutional-related variables on the levels and growth rates of output per capita (e.g. 
Barro, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Acemoglu etal. 2001 and 2004; and McArthur and Sachs, 2001). Even so, very little 
has been done in terms of evaluating empirically the influences of institutional quality
36 For example, datasets from Gastil (1979), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the 
Transparency International (Tl), Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) and Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) are now available.
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on technical innovation. This study endeavors to contribute to this literature by 
examining in more detail the links between institutions and technical innovation.
This chapter also presents a brief discussion of the challenges and limitations 
inherent in research that attempts to examine empirically the association between 
innovation and institutions. A workable way to proxy for knowledge creation is 
suggested and implemented in our empirical analysis. Moreover, while I 
acknowledge that the data used to conduct this analysis is subject to imperfections 
(e.g. measurement error); this study contributes to the literature by conducting an 
empirical examination on the links between innovation and institutions, in addition, 
follow-up discussions of the formulation of the empirical model and discussions on 
the results of the empirical analysis may stimulate a debate on an important question 
in the growth literature: which is the most favorable institutional arrangement to 
enhance innovation and economic growth? (Sala-I-Martin, 2002; Rodrik 2000; 
Huang and Xu, 1999; Dawson, 1998).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly revisits the 
discussion initiated in chapter 1 about the intrinsic challenges in conducting empirical 
evaluation on institutions and outlines the difficulties in measuring innovation. 
Section 2 also presents a workable way to proxy for knowledge creation. Section 3 
presents the data. Section 4 evaluates the empirical model and discusses the 
estimates. Section 5 reports the conclusion and suggestions for improving this 
empirical analysis.
3.2 Background
As shown in chapter 1, it is standard procedure in empirical growth literature 
to include institutions in the growth regressions as an ordinary explanatory variable
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of steady state per capita output (e.g. Barro, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 
1995 and 1997; Oliva and Rivera-Batiz, 2002; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003; Dollar 
and Kraay; 2003). This approach implicitly assumes that institutions affect the 
productivity of factors of production and implies that countries with better institutional 
arrangements will experience faster growth rates of per capita output.
Despite the appeal of this argument, most of the empirical analyses (see 
Table B.1) report only weak evidence that better institutional arrangement leads to 
faster growth (e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003). 
Moreover, there is a fundamental problem in this analysis. Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) regression-type cannot provide evidence that institutions affect long-run 
growth rates of the economy. The dependent variable (growth rates of output per 
capita) only accounts for the transitional dynamics of per capita income over a 
specific period of time and cannot be interpreted as steady state growth rate of per 
capita income. In other words, a statistically significant coefficient on an institutional 
measure supports the argument that institutions have a positive effect on steady 
state levels of per capita income and on transitional growth rates of output per 
capita, but one cannot jump to the conclusion that this implies steady-state growth 
effects. In addition, the studies cited above provide no formal theoretical model or 
empirical analysis that explains the mechanisms by which better institutions translate 
into faster growth rates of per capita output.
Furthermore, economists are increasingly aware that institutions affect the 
process of knowledge accumulation (e.g. Rodrik, 2000; Sala-I-Martin, 2002; 
Gradstein, 2004) and consequently that institutions affect the long-run growth of 
output. Therefore, if one wants not only to diagnose the problem of growth, but also 
search for ways to stimulate growth, it is very important to understand how
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institutions and innovation are linked. To my knowledge, just a few growth models 
explicitly address this issue (e.g. Huang and Xu, 1999; Fedderke, 2001; Gradstein, 
2004) and no empirical cross-country analysis directly exploits such a link.
3.2.1 An Empirical Model of Innovation
The model developed in chapter 2 yields a dynamic equation (equation 2.10) 
that suggests that changes in technology are associated with institutional 
arrangements. However, the knowledge production function is a nonlinear differential 
equation and cannot be directly estimated. One can overcome this obstacle by 
rewriting it as a discrete equation:
AAt = A t - A t_i = S A ;i1aH At_1T a (3.1)
where AA measures innovation, HA is personnel engaged in R&D, T is institutions 
and 5 and a are parameters. Equation 3.1 can be transformed to linearity by taking 
logarithms of both sides. Adding an error term and reparametrizing the model 
generates:
ln(AAt) = P0 +Pj ln(HM_,) + p2 ln(Ajt_j) + p3T  + v it (3.2)
where t represents time, i indexes observations, T denotes the logarithmic 
transformation of T  and v is random disturbance. This empirical equation is specified 
in terms of T  rather than ln(T) because i) this study uses standardized measures of 
institutions, which have zero mean and may assume negative values, preventing the 
use of logarithmic transformations and ii) the true measure of institutions is not
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known, so T is used as a proxy for ln(T)37. This procedure has become standard in 
the literature (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2000 and 2004; La Porta 
et al., 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999). Despite the apparent simplicity of equation 3.2, 
its estimation may be very difficult due to endogeneity and the difficulties in 
measuring A and T. These issues are examined below.
i) Measuring Institutions and Innovation
This study follows a growing branch of the growth literature that suggests 
subjective institutional measures provide relevant information about growth- 
promoting institutional arrangements and thus can be used as proxies for institutions 
(e.g. Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Mauro, 1995; Moers, 1999; Hall and Jones, 
1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2003). 
Specifically, this study uses four subjective measures of institutions: i) Rule of Law 
(RL), ii) Control of Corruption (C), iii) Regulatory Quality (RQ) and iv) Risk of 
Expropriation. Section 3 provides more details about these variables.
While innovation can be incorporated into theoretical models and is widely 
acknowledged as a key determinant of economic growth, difficulties in finding its 
empirical counterpart has limited empirical examinations (Romer, 2002). However, 
recent studies suggest that one can use “patents to create systematic measures of 
intangibles [innovation/knowledge] that drive economic growth” (Romer, 2002: ix, 
Foreword).
Schmookler (1966), Griliches (1979) and Griliches (1984) are the pioneers in 
using patent dount as a measure of innovation. These authors also provide the
37 See the next section for a detailed discussion about measurement error in T and the 
econometric strategy used to address this problem.
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foundations for the specification of a production function of knowledge as a function 
of R&D expenditure and the existing stock of knowledge. These contributions have 
opened a new and promising front of research, allowing researchers to use “patent 
data to get an empirical handle on quantifying the ‘importance’ or ‘value’ of 
innovations, measuring flows of technological knowledge and characterizing the 
technological development and impact of particular institutions and countries” (Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg, 2002:2).
The use of patent count as a measure of innovation has three main 
limitations: i) not all inventions are patented because some do not meet certain 
criteria necessary for an invention to be patentable, even though they increase the 
stock of knowledge; ii) patentable innovations may not be patented because 
economic agents may strategically “rely on secrecy or other means of 
appropriability” (Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002: 4) and iii) not all patents have the same 
quality. If the first and second limitations were present, the use of patents would 
underestimate the actual production of knowledge/innovation. In addition, the second 
problem may be aggravated in countries with poor protection of private property 
rights and fragile legal systems. In this case, it may be optimal for innovators to 
choose to rely on secrecy to protect their inventions. However, “it is widely believed 
that these limitations [i and ii] are not too severe, but that remains an open empirical 
issue” (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002: 56). In addition, one could invoke the ‘law of 
large number” and argue that the third limitation will not play any role given a 
significantly large sample size (Griliches, 1990).
Despite these drawbacks the most influential writers in the field of economic 
growth and innovation have supported the use of patent counts to measure 
innovation [or change in the stock of knowledge] (e.g. Griliches, 1979, 1990, 1994;
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Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Paul Romer, 2002 and Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). This 
has influenced other researchers to utilize patents to evaluate economic growth 
issues (e.g. Sedgley and Elmslie, 2004; Sedgley, 2004). This study follows this 
approach and, albeit imperfect, patent counts are utilized as a measure for 
innovation (A). Specifically, the accumulated number of patents granted over a 
period is utilized as a proxy for knowledge production/innovation, that is:
T
AArr = A iT -  A j0 = ^ p it = PiT
t=o
where p denotes the number of patents granted to country / and t indexes time.
Substituting the equation above into equation 3.2 generates:
ln(PiT) = P o  + P iln (H *o) + p2ln(Ai0) + p3Tl + v jt (3.3)
It is worth noticing that equation 3.3 differs from the empirical specification of 
previous studies that estimate a production function for patents. For instance, 
Griliches (1990) and Jaffe and Lerner (2002) specify an equation for patents as a 
function of R&D expenditure by different economic agents (universities, firms and 
government) using the previous production of patents as a proxy for existing stock of 
knowledge. The use of personnel engaged in R&D instead of R&D expenditure 
represents a change of the focus (from input costs to the input itself), but as shown 
by Griliches (1994), these variables are highly correlated and should contain 
comparable information about the production process. Moreover, equation 3.3 is an 
expanded version of the Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) knowledge production 
functions. More precisely, it explicitly highlights the significant role that institutional 
arrangements have in the process of knowledge production. To my knowledge, no
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cross-country study has evaluated the effect of institutions on the production of 
patents.
ii) Measuring the Stock of Knowledge (A)
The estimation of the patent production equation 3.3 requires an objective 
measure of the stock of knowledge. While patent production can be used to measure 
innovation from time t to T, one cannot create a measure of the stock of knowledge 
by using just data on patent production. Sedgley (2004) proposes to estimate the 
initial stock of knowledge by utilizing the ratio of total patents issued during a specific 
period over the growth of the number of volumes in the collection of the national 
library during the same period. Sedgley (2004) applies this method to conduct a 
time-series evaluation of innovation in the U.S. However, data limitation prevents the 
use of this procedure here. Moreover, in this study the key role of the stock of 
knowledge (A) is to measure a country’s share of world knowledge and determine its 
position on a hypothetical world knowledge frontier. I propose to build a proxy for the 
stock of knowledge based on a relative measure of book production. The rational for 
using this method is discussed below.
For simplicity’s sake, it is useful to distinguish two kinds of knowledge: explicit 
knowledge and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that can be 
easily systematized and stored in printed material or multimedia so that it can be 
easily transmitted across individuals and the scholarly community. Tacit knowledge 
is knowledge internalized by individuals and rooted in individual experience, 
personal beliefs, perspectives and values38. This kind of knowledge is hard to
38 "Tacit knowledge is not available as a text. . . .It involves intangible factors embedded in 
personal beliefs, experiences and values." Pan and Scarbrough (1999:362).
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formalize and convert into media (words or models) that can be easily shared and 
understood by other individuals (Polanyi, 1966, Zoltan and Perner, 1999; Clark, 
2000).
While tacit knowledge can be very important at the firm level, since it may 
translate into competitive advantage (Laszlo and Laszlo, 2002), explicit knowledge, 
whether privately acquired and/or public knowledge, is the key force in the 
innovation process and also seems to be a closer parallel to the concept of 
knowledge found in the endogenous growth literature. For example, the idea that 
knowledge production in a region may spillover into neighboring regions can only be 
supported if the new knowledge is made available to economic agents in 
neighboring areas.
Because there are a variety of modes for communicating and exchanging 
knowledge across individuals, such as books, reference material, television, internet, 
etc., there exist several difficulties in moving from a theoretical definition of 
knowledge to a quantitative measure of knowledge even if we restrict our attention to 
explicit knowledge. However, it seems plausible to assume that much of the explicit 
knowledge available to a society is contained in its literary production. As a result of 
the book production revolution in the middle of the fifteenth century, a “much greater 
proportion of the population has the chance to acquire education, culture and 
information” (Kipphan, 2001; 5). Moreover, Cochran (2001) argues that the “epoch of 
printing ... transmuted and magnified the inscribing powers of writing, creating 
previously unimaginable possibilities to organize and institutionalize secular 
knowledge” (Cochran, 2001: 3, emphasis added).
These thoughts support the idea that the stock of knowledge can be proxied 
by the country’s share of world book production (new titles). The logic behind this
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formulation is that a significant share of a society’s knowledge is transmitted across 
individuals and from generation to generation through books. While a patent is a 
tangible measure of innovation, book production is used a concrete measure of the 
current knowledge stock. In other words, a highly knowledgeable society is expected 
to produce a large number of book titles and consequently should have a larger 
share of world book production. A country’s share of world book production w ill be 
used as a proxy for the starting stock of knowledge in the regression analysis. For 
robustness’ purposes, I use two measures: the share of applied and pure sciences 
book production and the share of all new titles.
iii) Endogeneity
Another problem in estimating equation 3.3 is the potential endogeneity of the 
right-hand variables. In a cross-section of countries one can address that by using 
the initial values of H and A, which are predetermined and uncorrelated with the 
error term. However, T is measured contemporaneously and is likely to be 
endogenous. This undermines the reliability of estimates obtained by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). To eliminate this problem, a set of instruments for institutions, which 
needs to be correlated with current institutions but uncorrelated with innovation 
should be used.
The empirical literature on institutions suggests that much of the variation in 
current institutions can be explained by geography-related variables and historically 
determined factors such as colonial status and origin of the legal system (Hall and 
Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 
2001 and 2004). Following this approach and considering the theoretical model
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developed in chapter 2 (see equation 2.21), current institutions are modeled as 
follows:
T  = 8j + S 2Hit0 + 8 3Gi + 5 3R + rii (3.4)
where t  denotes institutions, H it0 denotes the initial endowment of human capital, G 
is a matrix of geographical variables, R is a matrix of “other” exogenous 
determinants of institutions (e.g., colonial status or legal origin) and r| is a random 
disturbance.
Equation 3.4 is very similar to the empirical specification for institutions found 
in La Porta et al. (1999), McArthur and Sachs (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2000, 
2001 and 2004). However, this study proposes to add previously accumulated 
human capital as a determinant of current institutions. More specifically, this 
equation states that the initial level of human capital is an important input in the 
shaping of early institutional arrangements. This proposition is motivated by the work 
of Bernard Mandeville (early 1700), who argues that the development of institutions 
is an evolutionary process depending on generations of accumulated knowledge39.
Acemoglu et al. (2000, 2001 and 2004) argue that early institutions were 
affected by geography because the colonization process endogenously responded 
to certain environment conditions, creating institutions specific to the colony’s 
geography. Specifically, colonies characterized by a heavy burden of infectious 
disease (e.g. malaria and yellow fever) discouraged the formation of European-type 
settlements. In these non-settler colonies “... colonial powers set-up authoritarian 
and absolutist states, with the purpose of solidifying their control and facilitating the 
extraction of resources” (Acemoglu et al., 2000:10). As a result, this form of
39 See Rosenberg (1963) for a detailed discussion on Bernard Mandeville’s ideas.
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colonization "... did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they 
provide checks and balances against government expropriation” (Acemoglu et al., 
2000:2).
On the other hand, geographically advantaged settlement colonies were 
relatively free to engage in processes that replicated in some way European social 
arrangements, which ultimately helped to develop better institutions and generate a 
system that protected private property rights in these colonies (Denoon, 1983; 
Acemoglu et al., 2000). Denoon (1983) argues that many settler colonies (e.g. US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand) had representative institutions during the 
colonial period and that those institutions constituted the basis of the modern 
institutions that emerged in those countries. Engerman and Sokoloff (2003), Gallup 
et al., (1999) and Sachs (2000) also support the view that adverse geography 
negatively affects the development of growth-promoting institutions. The influences 
of geography on institutions have been tested by including variables such as 
absolute latitude, mean temperature and proportion of land near a seacoast in the 
regressions used to explain current institutions.
It has also been argued that the historically predetermined origin of the legal 
system may have had a very important role in determining a country’s current 
institutional arrangements. According to La Porta et al. (1999), “[a] civil legal 
tradition, then, can be taken as a proxy for an intent to build institutions to further the 
power of the State” (p.232). The different civil law systems were spread throughout 
“the world through conquest, colonization, imitation and voluntary adoption” (La 
Porta et al., 1999:231). La Porta et al. (1999) suggest categorizing the legal systems 
into 5 groups: common law (British), French civil law (France), German civil law 
(German), Scandinavian civil law (Scandinavia) and socialist law (Soviet Union).
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Each of these legal systems is based on a set of principles that demarcate the role 
of the government in protecting property rights, defining regulatory systems and 
instituting political freedom. For instance, from a theoretical viewpoint, countries 
whose legal systems are based on the common law tradition are expected to be less 
interventionist and favor political and economic freedom when compared to countries 
whose legal system is based on one of the other legal traditions. Countries with 
socialist laws tend to have protectionist governments and limited political freedom 
(La Porta etal., 1999).
Therefore, considering that equation 3.4 well explains current institutions, 
then equations 3.3 and 3.4 form a system of equations - where T and P are 
endogenous - that links patent production (innovation) to institutions. This 
specification implies that the origin of the legal system, geographically related 
variables and the initial human capital endowment determine current institutions, but 
are uncorrelated with current production of patents (innovation). This setup may be 
contentious because one could argue that these variables are directly correlated with 
the production of patents even after controlling for institutions. This would imply that 
the system is not properly identified. However, it seems to be reasonable to 
presuppose that the colonial legacy directly influences current institutions, but has no 
direct effect on current innovation (patent production). The colonial legacy variables 
should not be correlated with equation 3.3’s error term. In other words, the 
innovation effect from the colonial legacy is felt through the impact on current 
institutions rather than directly influencing current innovation. Additionally, as argued 
previously, the initial human capital endowment may have affected early institutions, 
which ultimately shaped current institutions. Because current innovation is a function 
of contemporary institutions this variable should have an indirect effect on current
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patent production via current institutions. Finally, geography-related variables may 
have a direct effect on current institutions as well as a direct effect on innovation. 
Because this is an empirical question, it is examined together with the estimation of 
the model. These observations constitute, in fact, an empirical issue that can be 
evaluated by testing if such variables satisfy the requirements for valid instruments. 
This study uses the Hansen’s J test to examine this issue.
3.3 Data and Measurement Error
The empirical analysis is conducted using four different measures of 
institutions. Rule of Law (RL), Control of Corruption (C) and Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
are calculated as the average index through the time periods 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2002. These variables are from a recent dataset developed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2003), which covers 199 countries. These measures of institutions “are based on 
several hundred variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 
separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations”. Specifically, 
Regulatory Quality “includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and 
business development” (Kaufmann et al., 2003:3). Rule of Law includes “several 
indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. 
Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and 
social interactions and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected”
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(Kaufmann et al., 2003:3). Control of Corruption “measures perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain.... 
The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the 
corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a public 
official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions and hence 
represents a failure of governance according to our definition” (Kaufmann et al., 
2003:4).
The Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and Regulatory Quality indexes range 
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores indicating better institutional arrangements.
The fourth measure of institutional quality, EXPRO, is a proxy for market 
institutions and measures the risk of confiscation and forced nationalization. It is 
calculated as the average value for each country over the period 1985-1995 and 
rages between 0 and 10 with higher scores representing better institutions and thus 
lower risk of confiscation or forced nationalization. This variable is originally from 
Political Risk Services, but it was taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001).
The data on patents is from the World Bank and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). The USPTO provides information about the numbers of 
patents granted to non-residents back to the 1970s, that is, inventions created in 
countries other than the US whose inventors wish to patent their ideas in the US 
market. Non-resident patenting suggests that those inventions have some non- 
negligible economic value and may embody a valuable contribution to the stock of 
knowledge. Therefore, a proxy for innovation using USPTO data can be defined as 
follows:
2003
A A USPTO _  a  a  _  V  nUSPT0 -  PUSPT0
~  A i2003 ~  M i1970 “  / - ( " i t  i
t=1970
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where p denotes the number of patents granted to country /' and t indexes times.
The World Bank makes available data on patents granted by each country’s 
patent office to residents from 1995 to 2001. This data is used to generate another 
proxy for innovation between 1995 and 2001.
2001
a a w b _ a  _ a  _ y r )W B _ p WB 
— i2001 il995 — Z j P it ~  i
t=1995
Despite the fact that patent counts greatly differ across these datasets; there 
is a 0.81 correlation between the natural logarithms of pjUSPTO and PjWB for the period 
1995-2001 and a 0.79 correlation between these measures using all available data 
(USPTO: 1970-2003 and World Bank: 1995-2001). The model is estimated using 
both the USPTO and World Bank datasets in order to make the results more robust. 
This requires running regressions for each dataset, which demands collecting data 
that match the time periods for which the statistics on patents are available.
As previously discussed, equation 3.3 can be only estimated if an objective 
measure of the initial stock of knowledge is provided and this study proposes a proxy 
for the stock of knowledge based on book production. Data on book production are 
from several years of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook and defined as the number 
of book titles produced (non-periodical publications) by each country. The statistics 
include book production in applied sciences, pure sciences, social sciences, 
philosophy, arts, geography, history and generalities. In a cross-section analysis 
such as the one undertaken in this study, the initial values play a key role in 
determining the parameter estimates. In order to minimize noise from a single year 
data the calculations are made using the average number of books produced over a 
five years period. In a few cases, the statistics are not available for all five years
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during the time period considered and the average is calculated using the available 
information. Specifically, A0 is calculated as follows:
1972 /
S B ,,, /n ,
where B denotes yearly book title production, i indexes countries, t indexes time and 
n denotes the number of years for which the data is available. This variable can be 
interpreted as the share of average yearly book production relative to book 
production in the United States. As previously discussed, this variable is intended to 
proxy the initial stock of knowledge. To conform to the availability of the patent data, 
this variable is measured over 1968 to 1972 (bookshare6872) and over 1995 to 1999 
(bookshare9599). Moreover, two alternative measures are utilized: the share of all 
new titles produced and the share of applied and pure sciences book production.
Personnel engaged in R&D is measured as the total number of scientists, 
engineers, technicians and supporting staff engaged in research and development. 
The data on personnel is expressed as a full-time equivalent. This variable is from 
several years of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. The data is not comprehensive 
in the sense that it does not provide a large cross-section of countries for the same 
year. In numerous cases, the statistics are available just for a few years during the 
time period considered. Averages over a five years period are utilized to maximize 
the sample size. Specifically,
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where L denotes labor force engaged in R&D, i indexes countries, t indexes time and 
n ^ 5 denotes the number of years for which the data is available. This variable is 
measured over 1968 to 1972 (rdperso68) and over 1995 to 2001 (rdperson95).
The idea that the development of institutions is an evolutionary process 
depending on previously accumulated knowledge is accounted for in the empirical 
model by including a variable that measures human capital accumulation in the early 
20th century. This variable is calculated as the number of students in school in 1920 
per squared kilometer. Data on students enrolled in primary and secondary schools 
in early 20th century is from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Mitchell provides these 
statistics back to the eighteenth century only for a few countries. A representative 
cross-country sample can be only collected around 1920. Mitchell reports the 
number of children enrolled in primary and secondary schools for 68 countries in 
1920 and statistics for 52 countries around the 1930s, which allows us to estimate 
the number of children in schools in 192040. Therefore, the full sample has 120 
countries. The country area, which is needed to calculate the schooling density 
variable, is from the United Nations and based upon the current geopolitical 
arrangement. Countries that experienced changes in their boundaries, such as the 
former URSS republics, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, India, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Algeria and Zaire were not included in the regression analysis41.
The geographic variables are taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001) and La 
Porta et al. (1999). It is used i) mean temperature (Meantemp), which measure the
40 I use the geometric growth rates in the estimations. For instance, if a country has data on 
enrollment between 1930 and 1940, the geometric growth rate between these periods is utilized 
to estimate enrollment back to 1920.
41 In fact, these countries were not included in our analysis because of missing data or simply 
because they did not exist back to the beginning of the 20 century.
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1987 mean annual temperature in degrees Celsius; ii) coastal land (It 100 km), which 
quantifies the proportion of land area within 100 km of the coast and iii) latitude, 
which quantifies the absolute value of the latitude, is scaled to take values between 
0 and 1. This variable is taken from La Porta et al. (1999).
The colonial legacy is measured by a set of dummy variables that identify the 
origin of a country’s legal system. Specifically, these dummies identify if the origin of 
the legal system is English, French, German, Scandinavian, or Socialist. These 
variables were taken from La Porta et al. (1999)42.
Measurement error
Almost all economic variables are measured with error and this problem is 
augmented in this study due to the nature of the variables been studied. If an 
explanatory variable is measured with error, it is necessarily correlated with the error 
term. In the presence of measurement error OLS estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). According to Hall and Jones (1999), 
this problem can be addressed together with the endogeneity issue by using the IV
estimator. Consider that institutions are measured with an error, such that:
T = T + //  (3.5)
where T is unobserved institutions, T  is measured institutions and p is the
measurement error. Substituting equation 3.5 into equation 3.4 gives:
ln(PjT) = A) + A  ln(H a* ) + P i l n ( A i o )  + A T , + A A  + vft (3.6)
42 According to La Porta et al. (1999), this variable is a more direct measure of the colonial status 
of a country and overcomes difficulties in identifying the colonial status of particular countries. 
T o r example, Barro (1996b) does not classify Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Italy as former 
colonies, even though each was at time (at least partially) controlled by the Habsburg empire and 
the former two were arguably colonized by the Soviet Union as well.” (La Porta et al., 1999:265).
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The explanatory variables from equation 3.3 and 3.4 can be stacked in 
matrices Z=[HAo A0] and X=[H0 G R] respectively. If X  is a valid instrument forT  
then E[X’v]=0. Assuming that p is uncorrelated with v, Z and X; |33 is identified by
the orthogonality conditions and both the measurement error and the endogeneity 
concerns are addressed.
3.4 Regression Analysis
Table F.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables utilized in this study. 
The differences in the sample size reported in this table are the result of missing 
data. While we have data on institutional measures for about 200 countries, we only 
have data on patent count (USPTO) for about 100 countries. The regressions were 
run using all available data.
Table F.2 and Figures G.1-G.4 show that patent production is strongly 
correlated with all four institutional measures. For example, Figure G.1 plots patent 
production using the USPTO data between 1970 and 2003 and the rule of law index. 
It shows that the countries with the highest measures of rule of law are the USA, 
Germany and Japan, which are among the countries with the highest levels of patent 
production. On the other hand, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq have 
the lowest measures of rule of law and are also among the countries with lowest 
patent production. This positive association between Rule of Law and patent 
production is also found when we use other measures of institutions, such as control 
of corruption, regulatory quality and the risk of expropriation index (see Figures G.2, 
G.3 and G.4 in Appendix G).
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W e use regression analysis to test if the positive relationship between 
institutions and patent production holds as we account for other factors that influence 
patent production. Several alternative specifications and different methods of 
estimation are utilized to evaluate the robustness of the results. W e follow Acemoglu 
et al. (2001 and 2004) and La Porta et al. (1999) and estimate equation 3.4 using 
OLS. Subsequently, equation 3.5 is estimated using OLS and the 2SLS-IV methods.
3.4.1 Determinants of Institutions
Despite the fact that appraising the determinants of institutions is not the 
primary goal of this study, our model of patent production requires finding suitable 
instruments for institutions. This necessitates at least some evaluation of the 
determinants of institutions43.
Tables F.3 and F.4 provide the estimates of equation 3.4 using the different 
four institutional measures. The dependent variable in models 1 thru 4, 5 thru 8, 9 
thru 12 and 13 thru 16 are Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality 
and Risk of Expropriation, respectively. The adjusted R-squared indicates that over 
60 percent of the variation in Control of Corruption and Rule of Law can be explained 
by the set of explanatory variables included in the estimates. The model explains 
about 50 percent of the variation in Regulatory Quality and Risk of Expropriation. 
The overall fit of the model is in accordance with previous studies in the field (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2004; La Porta et al.,1999). It is worth noticing that mean 
temperature and latitude are highly correlated (-0.85) and provide comparable 
information about climate conditions. Including these two variables simultaneously
43 A detailed discussion on the determinants of institutions can be found in Acemoglu et al. (2000, 
2001 and 2004) and La Porta et al. (1999).
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may cause severe multicollinearity but not improve the model’s fit. The best 
parsimonious specification seems to include only mean temperature and the share 
of land in the coast as controls for geographic influences.
Table F.4 reports OLS regressions using Regulatory Quality (RQ) as the 
dependent variable. The geographic-related variables have the expected sign and 
are statistically significant. This suggests that countries with lower mean temperature 
(or ones further away from the Equator) and with relatively more coastland tend to 
have better regulatory systems. In all four regressions, while controlling for 
geographically related variables and legal origin, human capital density in the early 
20th century has a positive and statistically significant influence on regulatory quality, 
that is, countries that accumulated relatively more human capital in the early 20th 
century turned out to have more market-friendly policies. In addition, as expected, 
socialist legal origin is associated with relatively more market-unfriendly policies 
such as price controls, inadequate bank supervision and excessive regulation in 
foreign trade and business development. The regressions also suggest that the 
Scandinavian, French, German and British legal systems perform similarly in terms 
of affecting the Regulatory Quality, once we account for geographically related 
influences and initial human capital accumulation.
Table F.4 also reports the OLS regressions using Risk of Expropriation as 
the dependent variable. The results are similar to those found in the model for 
Regulatory Quality. Specifically, adverse geography dampens the development of 
institutions and increases the risk of expropriation. The regressions also support that 
initial level of human capital contributes to the reduction of the risk of expropriation 
and that socialist origin of the legal system increases the risk of expropriation. The 
coefficients of French legal origin are negative and significant at the 10% level,
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which suggests that countries with French origin may have a higher risk of 
expropriation.
Table F.3 shows the results using Control of Corruption and Rule of Law as 
the dependent variables. In all regressions, Socialist and French legal origins serve 
to increase the perception of corruption (decrease the index of corruption control) 
and deteriorate agents’ perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. Despite a few 
coefficients of initial level of human capital that are only marginally significant, the 
estimates do show a consistently positive coefficient for human accumulation in the 
early 20th century. This supports the idea that countries that accumulated relatively 
more human capital in the early 20th century tend to have institutional arrangements 
that control corruption and improved enforceability of contracts and effectiveness 
and predictability of the judiciary.
The estimates also provide evidence that, controlling for initial human capital 
and legal origin, geographically related variables are important in explaining 
institutions. Finally, controlling for geographical related variables, legal origin and 
initial human capital, all of the tested regressions suggest that population density in 
the early 20th century has no effect on current institutions44.
As stated before, appraising the determinants of institutions is not the primary 
goal of this study. However, the estimates above contribute to this debate because 
the regression analysis is conducted using a recent dataset on institutional quality 
and a measure of human capital accumulation in the early 20th century. Furthermore,
44 This was tested using both a linear and a quadratic specification for population density. In 
addition, there is a strong correlation between schooling density and population density, which 
suggests that a potential impact of agglomeration on institutions may have already been 
accounted for by including the schooling density variable.
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the results discussed above are in accordance with previous findings in this field. For 
instance, La Porta et al. (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that French and 
Socialist legal [only la Porta] origins have negative effects on the measures of 
governance, i.e., a property rights index, a business regulation index and a 
corruption index. Hall and Jones (1999), La Porta et al. (1999), Acemoglu et al.
(2001), McArthur and Sachs (2001) also find that geographically related variables 
affect current institutions. While we are able to replicate the findings of previous 
empirical examinations, this study adds a new finding that schooling density in the 
early 1900’s also helps to explain current institutions. In addition, we also find no 
significant effect of the French legal system on Regulatory Quality. This result casts 
some doubt on previous findings that the French legal system contributes to worsen 
current institutions compared to, for instance, the Common Law system.
3.4.2 Institutions and Innovation: 2SLS-IV Estimates
The results from regressions 1 thru 16 suggest that the dummy variables for 
the origin of the legal system, geographically related variables and schooling density 
in the early 1900’s explain much of the variation in current institutions, implying that 
these variables are potentially good candidates to instrument institutions. I examine 
this hypothesis using the Hansen’s J overidentification test.
Tables F.5 thru F.9 report the regressions of the determinants of innovation 
using different measures of institutions and patent counts from both the USPTO and 
the World Bank. In these four tables, the dependent variable in models 1 thru 5 is the 
USPTO patent count between 1970 and 2003 and the dependent variable in models 
6 thru 10 is the World Bank patent count between 1995 and 2001. Models 1, 2, 6 
and 7 only include variables suggested by the theoretical model developed in
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chapter 2. The other models are augmented to evaluate the model’s robustness. 
Models 1 and 6 are OLS estimates and all of the other models are 2SLS-IV 
estimates.
The results reported in Tables F.5 thru F.9 show that the OLS estimates 
underestimate the impact of institutions on innovation. In all forty regressions the 
2SLS-IV estimates of the coefficients on institutions are larger than the 
corresponding coefficients generated by OLS. This clearly indicates that there exists 
significant measurement error in the institutional variables, which is not accounted 
for in the OLS regressions, thus generating significant bias in the OLS estimates.45
In all of the regressions presented in Tables F.5 thru F.9 the coefficients on 
personnel engaged in R&D and share of book production have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant46. While these variables are not our key interest, they 
control for the size of an economy and the position of a country on the world 
knowledge frontier, allowing us to evaluate the ‘net’ influences of institutions on 
patents production 47
The estimates provide evidence that institutions have a strong positive effect 
on innovation. Specifically, the coefficients on institutional measures are positive and 
statistically significant in all of the regressions reported in Tables F.5 thru F.9. This 
suggests that economies that have market-friendly policies, lower perception of
45 This finding is consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2001).
46 In Table F.8, models 7 thru 10, the coefficients on book production are only marginally 
significant.
47 In a set of regressions not reported, we tested an alternative measure of book production. More 
precisely, I use the share of applied and pure science book production instead of the share of all 
new titles produced. There are no significant quantitative differences compared to those results 
reported in Tables F.5 -  F.7, which corroborates the model’s specification. However, the 
coefficient on applied and pure science book production is found to be positive but insignificant at 
the 5 % significance levels in the regressions for the Risk of Expropriation. The significance and 
sign of the other coefficients in these regressions are not affected.
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corruption, or whose judiciary systems are more effective and predictable will gave 
faster rates of innovation. For example, the estimates suggest that if Brazil had the 
same market regulatory system as that of the U.S. (the difference in the regulatory 
quality index between these two countries is about 1.2), 257% more patents would 
have been granted between 1970 and 2003. The model also suggests that 
controlling for the differences between the Brazilian and the American indexes of 
control of corruption or rule of law, Brazilian patent production, between 1970 and 
2003, would be approximately four times bigger that it actually was. The presence of 
measurement errors in quantifying institutions implies that interpretation of the 
coefficients of the model may be imprecise. However, the impacts of improving 
institutions on patent production seem to be reasonable.
The specification above implicitly assumes that adverse geography affects 
innovation through an indirect effect from institutions. This specification is similar to 
those used by Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004) and Hall and Jones (1999). 
However, Gallup et al. (1999), Sachs (2000) and McArthur and Sachs (2001) argue 
that geography may have a direct effect on production as well as an indirect effect 
from institutions. The argument could be made that spatial location contributes 
directly to innovation. For instance, mean temperature (climate) may affect the 
health of the personnel engaged in R&D48. Sachs (2000) argues that the burden of 
malaria -  a disease specific to tropical climates - is necessarily lower in temperate 
zones. Models 3 and 8 in Tables F.5-F.9, report the estimates of the basic model 
augmented with mean temperature and the share of land in the coast. The 
regressions provide no support to the claim that geographically related variables
48 McArthur and Sachs (2001) refer to this effect as “disease ecology”.
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have direct effects on innovation. Specifically, once we have controlled for 
institutions, the coefficients of mean temperature and share of land in the coast are 
insignificant at the standard levels of significance in all regressions49.
Endogenous growth theory suggests that the size of population may affect 
innovation (e.g. Kremer, 1993). Specifically, innovation may be more likely to occur 
in regions with a large population because of the potential for increasing returns to 
scale and lower transactions costs. However, inefficiencies due, for example, to 
pollution and crime and resource diversion due to, for example, increased cost of 
commuting and real estate, may be generated as population density grows (Sedgley 
and Elmslie, 2004). Models 9 and 10 in Tables 3-5 thru 3.8 test the hypothesis that 
agglomeration and congestion might be important forces in the economics of 
innovation. Controlling for institutions, personnel engaged in R&D and initial stock of 
knowledge; the results suggest that population density has no direct linear effect on 
patent production. A quadratic specification, allowing us to test the agglomeration 
and congestion effects also provides no evidence that population density affects 
patent production50. However, we were able to find a positive association between 
population size (population density and absolute population) in a set of regressions 
(not reported) that excludes personnel engaged in R&D and adds population size. 
This is not surprising because there is a positive correlation between population size 
and personnel engaged in R&D. The size of the economy is accounted for in the 
original model by the inclusion of personnel engaged in R&D.
49 In a set of regressions not reported, mean temperature was substituted for absolute latitude. 
The results are similar, that is, the coefficients of absolute latitude turned out to be insignificant in 
all regressions.
50 We also tested the natural logarithm of the population aged 15-64 instead of population 
density. The results are similar.
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3.4.3 Robustness
Although the results detailed in the presentation seem reasonable, the 
estimates are subject to several assumptions. Specifically, the results above depend 
on data quality, model specification and econometric postulates. While statistical 
tests will not provide definitive answers concerning the validity of the model, 
complementary estimates and statistical tests will increase our confidence in the 
model’s predictions.
3.4.3.1 Overidentification Test.
The validity of the 2SLS-IV results depends on the assumption that the model 
can be properly identified by the set of proposed instruments. In other words, the 
2SLS-IV estimator requires that the set of instruments for institutions (geographically 
related variables, dummies for the origin of the legal system and schooling density in 
the 1900’s ) is uncorrelated with the error term of the patent production equation.
One can assess this issue by using overidentification tests. In this study, we 
use the Hansen's J statistic51 to evaluate the overidentifying restrictions in the 2SLS- 
IV regressions. This test evaluates the joint null-hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term. Under the null, the test 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions and 
is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Hayashi, 2000). While this 
approach is useful to corroborate the validity of the instruments, the test needs to be 
interpreted cautiously because of the "... usual problems of power associated with 
overidentification tests” (Acemoglu et al., 2001:1393).
51 See Hansen (1982) for details about this test.
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Tables F.5 thru F.9 report the Hansen's J statistic for all of the estimated 
models. This test supports the overidentifying restrictions present in our model for 
Control of Corruption, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality because the null- 
assumption cannot be rejected at the standard levels of significance. Keeping the 
caveat above in mind, the overidentification test results give more confidence in the 
validity and robustness of the estimates. However, at the 10% level of significance, 
the overidentification test statistics reject the null-hypothesis in models 1 thru 5, in 
Table F.8. This casts some doubt that the model for risk of expropriation is correctly 
identified.
3.4.3.2 Model’s Specification.
Equation 3.22 is derived from a theoretical model, but the functional form 
chosen is subject to imperfections. Despite the fact that the theoretical equation is 
nonlinear, it can be transformed to linearity by taking logarithms. However, a log- 
linear form may not be the best specification for the relationship between institutions 
and innovation, so alternative specifications can be used to check the robustness of 
the results. This section examines this issue by testing if the influences of institutions 
on patent production vanish when institutional arrangements reach some specific 
level. It may be the case that there are no substantial effects from institutions on 
patent production across OECD countries because most of these countries have 
reached an “institutional quality threshold” that puts no restrictions to innovation. If 
this were the case, institutional differences across these countries may not have any 
affect on innovation. This issue is evaluated by using two approaches: the first 
strategy consists of specifying an equation using a quadratic form for institutions. 
The second approach uses dummy variables and interaction terms to test if there is
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a differentiated effect of institutions on innovation across OECD countries and non- 
OECD countries
i) Quadratic form
A special nonlinear specification for modeling the relationship between 
institutions and innovation can be written as follows:
ln(Prr) =  P o  + P x  ln(H Ato) +  P2 n^(A i0) +  P 3 T j  + P 3 T 2 + v jt (3.7)
This equation is linear in parameters but the econometric techniques needed 
to estimate this quadratic equation are not straightforward because of the
nonlinearity in one of the endogenous variables (T) .  According to Wooldridge
(2002), this creates a system nonlinear in endogenous variables and the 
identification of any such model “...needs to be treated differently” (p. 231 )52. It is 
necessary to find a set of instruments suitable to explain T 2 that is not identical to the 
set used to instrument f . This implies that one needs to extend the system by 
adding an equation for T2. Wooldridge (2002) argues that the squared values of the
original set of instruments plus their cross-terms are natural instruments forT2. The 
new equation should also contain the linear values of the set of instruments. 
Accordingly, we augment the system by adding the following equation:
T 2 = <5, + t>2H it0 + £3G; + S3R  + S2U l  0 + £3G 2 + S3R 2 +(jC  + t i (3.8)
52 One may be tempted to instrument, for instance, T 2, by calculating the squared value of
predicted T , which is estimated using a specific set of exogenous variables (instruments). 
However, this procedure will produce inconsistent estimators and is called “forbidden regression” 
(Wooldridge, 2002:236). Precisely, the term forbidden regression “describes replacing a nonlinear 
function of an endogenous explanatory variable with the same nonlinear function of fitted values 
from a first-stage [linear] estimation” (Wooldridge, 2002:236).
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where C denotes the cross products between H, G and R, x is a error term and all 
other variables are defined as before.
The system of equations is now the collection of equations 3.4, 3.6 and 3.8. 
Table F.9 provides the 2SLS-IV estimates of this model. The basic results still hold in 
this specification and the coefficient on the quadratic term is insignificant in the 
model whose institutional measures are Control of Corruption, Rule of Law and Risk 
of Expropriation. This suggests that in a cross-sectional of countries the positive 
effects of institutions on innovation do not vanish when T  increases. In addition, the 
coefficient of the quadratic term on Regulatory quality is found to be positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that there is a nonlinear 
relationship between regulatory quality and patent production. This implies that 
patent production increases at increasing rates as a result of improvements in the 
regulatory system.
ii) Dummy variable approach
W e use the dummy variable approach to examine if institutions differently 
affect patent production across OECD and non-OECD countries. Specifically, we 
test whether the slope and intercept of the model change for countries with relatively 
good institutional arrangements vis-a-vis countries with poor institutional 
arrangements. In order to conduct this test, equation 3.5 is augmented as follows:
ln(PlT) = /?0+ A  ln(H  Al0) + p2 ln (A i0) + + &O ECD + * OECD + vit (3.9)
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where OECD is a dummy variable that assumes value 1 for countries that are 
member of the OECD and zero for all other countries53. All other variables are 
defined as before.
The modified model, given by equations 3.9 and 3.4, has the same properties 
of the original model, does not add an extra burden to the estimation process and 
the 2SLS-IV method can still be used to estimate the model. Table F.9 provides the 
estimates of this spline function. W e find that all coefficients of the OECD dummy 
variable and all the coefficients of the interaction term (OECD*lnstitution) are 
statistically insignificant at standard levels. This suggests that the hypothesized 
threshold for the OECD countries may not exist and that the marginal effect of 
institutions on patent production is similar for OECD and non-OECD countries54.
3.4.3.3 Institutions as the Fundamental Determinant of Innovation.
Even though the empirical equation used to estimate the influences of 
institutions on innovation was derived directly from the theoretical model, the 
empirical strategy used here may be controversial because it differs from the 
standard approach. Specifically, institutions are assumed to be the fundamental 
engine of long-run economic performance, so institutions solely are expected to 
explain much of the variations, for instance, in income levels (e.g. Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2000, 2001; and 2004; Rodrik, 2000). In this literature, 
income levels are regressed against only institutional measures and geographically
53 This equation is known as spline function (Greene, 2000:324).
54 It was tested if the coefficients on institutions are still significant if potential outliers are 
excluded/controlled in the regression analysis. I created a dummy variable with values 1 for USA, 
JPN, FRA, DEU, UK (top innovator), BGD, CMR, GHA, LBY and MWI (bottom innovators) and 
zero otherwise. The coefficient on this dummy variable turned out to be insignificant. In addition, 
this did not affect the significance or the size of the coefficients on institutions. Moreover, 
excluding the countries above from the regression analysis did not change the results.
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related variables. For robustness purposes and to conform to this strategy, we re- 
estimate the model for patent production (equation 3.6) excluding all variables other 
than the institutional measure. Specifically, we estimate:
ln(PlT) = J50 + +J3l ju + vit (3.6B)
where T  is measured institutions, p is the measurement error and v is a white
noise. The dependent variable is redefined in terms of patent production per 
workforce (in the initial period).
T
SPit
P  — t= 0
iT "  N 0
where p denotes the number of patents granted to country i, t indexes time and N0 
denotes total population aged 15-64 in 197055.
Table F.10 provides the 2SLS-IV estimates of equation 3.6B. The coefficient 
estimates on institutions are positive and statistically significant in all regressions. 
Table F.10 also shows the estimates of equation 3.6 augmented by geographical 
controls. The coefficients of mean temperature and proportion of land within the 100 
km of the seacoast are not significant at 5 percent significance levels in all the 
regressions56. In addition, the models for Control of Corruption, Rule of Law and 
Regulatory Quality ‘survive’ the overidentification tests. However, the 
overidentification test casts doubt about the validity of the identification of the model 
for Risk of Expropriation.
55 It was also tested a model using the average size of workforce between 1970 and 2003. The 
results are very similar and no significant quantitative differences are found. It is worth noticing 
that this specification implicitly assumes that the labor force participation is constant over time 
and so, the estimates will be biased if this assumption does not hold.
56 In the equation for regulatory quality, the coefficient of mean temperature is significant at the 
10% level.
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These results corroborate our previous findings that i) institutions are key 
determinants of innovation and, once controlled for the effects of geography on 
institutions, geographically related variables have no effect on innovation. 
Geography affects innovation, but only through institutions.
3.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature of institutions and economic growth by 
conducting an exploratory empirical examination on the links between innovation 
and institutions. Using cross-country data and the instrumental variable method, we 
construct an econometric model that evaluates the influences of institutions on 
technical innovation (patent production). For robustness’ purposes, several 
alternative specifications are estimated and an overidentification test is used to 
evaluate the validity of the set of variables utilized to instrument institutions.
The estimates obtained show that institutional arrangements positively 
contribute to explain much of the variation on patent production across-countries. 
While most of the previous literature on institutional and economic performance is 
able to show a positive association between institutions and levels of income, but 
fails to show a positive association between institutions and levels the growth rate of 
income; this study provides evidence that institutions have a growth effect on income 
because institutional quality affects an economy’s rate of innovation, the engine of 
economic growth. This research also finds that geography, per se, cannot explain 
differences in innovation across-countries. Geography affects innovation, but only 
through institutions.
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CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study endeavors to incorporate institutions in the standard growth 
theoretical framework and examines the links between institutions and technical 
innovation by developing a theoretical model that explicitly accounts for the effects of 
institutions on economic performance. Furthermore, this study assesses empirically 
the influences of institutional quality on patent production, which is a tangible 
measure of technical innovation. This chapter provides a broad view of the major 
theoretical and empirical findings from this study.
Chapter 1 reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on institutions 
and economic performance and discusses the challenges faced in attempting to 
empirically evaluate the influences of institutions on economic performance as well 
as to modeling institutions in a formal growth framework. A major finding from this 
literature review is that it is difficult to provide conclusive empirical evidence to 
support the idea that institutions matter for economic growth. Although several 
studies have attempted to demonstrate that institutions affect the transitional growth 
rate of output per capita, there is still no empirical evidence that institutions operate 
to determine the steady-state growth of GDP per capita. In addition, the review of the 
literature shows that the evaluations of the impacts of institutions on technical 
innovation are generally disregarded in both empirical investigations of cross-country 
economic performance and formalized growth models. The survey of the literature
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also puts forward the ad hoc nature of the econometric specification found in studies 
that evaluate the links between institutions and economic performance. These 
findings suggest that a current important task in economists’ agenda is to address 
the effects of institutions on innovation. This motivates the analysis developed in 
chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 2 evaluates the influence of institutions on economic performance by 
developing a model that explicitly examines how institutions affect technical 
innovation and economic growth. A major prediction of the theoretical model is that 
better institutional arrangements boost innovation and thus economic growth. For 
instance, the lack of proper institutions will retard or prevent the utilization of newly 
invented inputs in the productive process, leading to relatively lower levels of output. 
Therefore, controlling for all other determinants of income, countries or regions that 
experience institutional constraints to adopt newly invented technologies are 
expected to lag behind in terms of growth and levels of output per capita and this 
gap does not vanish over time. The model also predicts that, at the steady state, the 
stock of human capital should not be associated with the growth rate of output; 
rather the growth rate of human capital should be associated with the growth rate of 
output.
Chapter 3 presents the empirical analysis - which uses cross-country data 
and the instrumental variable method - of the influences of institutions on technical 
innovation. The results support the hypothesis that institutions explain a significant 
portion of the variation in patent production across-countries and provide evidence 
that control of corruption, market-friendly policies, protection of private propriety and 
a more effective judiciary systems have a growth effect on income because 
institutional quality affects an economy’s rate of innovation, the engine of economic
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growth. This analysis also finds evidence that geography, per se, cannot explain 
innovation across-countries.
Future research in this area might want to refine the measure of innovation 
utilized in this study or look for alternative ways to measure technical innovation. 
One possible approach would be calculating total factor productivity and regressing it 
against institutional measures. There is much to do in terms of modeling institutions 
and institutional effects in growth models. The model developed in this study shows 
that some predictions from well-known growth models may not hold under a 
framework that explicitly accounts for institutional quality. Therefore, there is much 
more to be learned from incorporating institutions in the standard economic growth 
framework.
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Appendix A: Measuring Institutions
Table A.1: Measures of Institutions
Institution Organization Variables
Range (higher 




•  International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG)
• Rule of Law
• Contract enforcement




• 1984-2003 (-1 0 0 )
Law Enforcement •  Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi,
(2003) • Rule of Law • -2 .5 -2 .5 • 1996-2002 (-2 0 0 )
• Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence (BERI)








• •  1980-2003 (-53)
•  Polity III dataset (Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and
• Executive Constraints •  1 -7
• 00 o 0 1 co CO T o o
Social Research) • Democracy • 0 -1 0
• Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
(2003)
•  Political Stability
• Voice and Accountability
•  -2 .5 -2 .5
• -2 .5 -2 .5 • 1996-2002 ( -200)
Political Institutions •  Number of Revolutions and
Barro (1991) Coups
•  Number of assassinations
• Absolute number •  1960-1985
Freedom House/Gastil •  Political Freedom Index
•  Civil Liberty Index •  1972-2002 • 1974-1989
•  ICRG •  Political Risk index • 0-100 • 1984-2003 (-1 0 0 )•  Democracy • 0-6
Public Administration: •  ICRG • Quality of Bureaucracy •  0 -6 • 1984-2003 (-1 0 0 )
• Corruption •  0 - 6
• Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, • Government Effectiveness • -2 .5 -2 .5 • 1996-2002 (-2 0 0 )
(2003) •  Corruption •  - 2 . 5 - 2 5
• Transparency International •  Corruption • 0-10 • 1996-2003(+100)



















• Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 








• 1984-2003 (-1 0 0 )
Market Structure: World Bank, IMF •Black Market foreign exchange 
premium
• - -
Heritage Foundation •  Economic Freedom Index








• Easterly and Levine, 1997 • Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity • •
Social Interaction • Knack and Keefer, 1997
•  Trust
• Percentage of 
respondents in each nation 
replying “most people can 
be trusted” • 1990(26)
• Civic Cooperation •  0-10
•  Putnam’s social capital •  Density of associational activity
• ICRG •  Ethnic Tensions
CO1o• •  1984-2003 (-1 0 0 )
Global Measures
•  BERI •  BERI Composite Score • 0-16 • 1980-2003 (-53)













Appendix B: The Empirics of institutions and Economic Performance





Other main Econometric Instrument for
countries/period explanatory variables Method institutions










Change Contract-intensive money 
(NR)
Change Frequency of Revolutions and 
coups ( N R )
Change ICRG index ( NR )
Change Freedom House Index (NR) 
Change Wars deaths ( N R ) 
Significance depends on 4 outliers 
(US, CA, Australia, New Zealand)
•  Average real per capita 


















Contract enforcement (+ NA) 
Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity (- NA) 
Black Market foreign exchange 
premium ( -  NA)
•  Population density


























Democracy (+ NA) 
Rule of Law (NA +FDI)











Economic freedom index (+ +NR) 
Civil liberty Index (I I)
Political Freedom Index (I I)
•  Initial GDP
• Investment,







Economic freedom index (+ +NR) 
Civil liberty Index (I I)
Political Freedom Index (I I)
















Continued: Table B.1: Institutions and Growth of G DP Per Capita: Main Empirical Studies


















Civic cooperation (+NR +) 
Putnam’s social capital (I I)
















Freq. of coups/revolutions (I I) 
Political assassinations (- I) 
Policy volatility (- -NR) 














ICRG index (+ +)
BERI index (+ +)
Freq. of coups/revolutions (- -) 
Political assassinations (- -)
•  Initial GDP
•  Government 
consumption
• Investment price (IP)
•  Deviation from IP
•  schooling
OLS None
•  Initial GDP








Policy volatility (NR NR)
Freq. of coups/revolutions (N R -)










Freq. of coups/revolutions (- -) 
Political assassinations (- -)
•  Investment,
•  Investment price (IP)










Democracy (I +) 
Policy Volatility (- -)
•  Population growth
•  Investment
• Inflation, export growth
OLS none













Table B.2: Institutions and Levels of G DP Per Capita: Main Empirical Studies















Risk of expropriation ( + )  




• Value for 
resources
• Landocked
• Dummies for 
colonizer
IV • Settler mortality
Dollar and Kraay, 
2003
121-154 (* sample 
size depends on 
specification)
1995
• Contract-intensive money (NR)
• Frequency of Revolutions and coups 
( N R )
•  ICRG index ( N R )
• Freedom House (NR)
•  Wars deaths ( N R )
• Rule of Law ( N R )
Significance depends on 4 outliers (US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand)
• Population
• Trade/gdp








• Fraction population 
speaking English at 
birth
• Fraction population 













Risk of expropriation (+  ) 







• Urbanization in 1500

















Continued: Table B.2: Institutions and Levels of G DP Per Capita: Main Empirical Studies
Study Number of countries/period
Institutional measures 












• Risk of expropriation ( + )
( ranges 0-10 -  higher score means more 
protection against risk of expropriation)





• Adult mortality rates 
in the 19th century
• Mean temperature
•  Proportion of land 
within 100km of the 
sea coast
• Latitude
•  Hydrocarbon 
production per capita











• Risk of expropriation ( + )
( ranges 0-10 -  higher score means more 
protection against risk of expropriation)
•  Constraint on executive
• Democracy
• Latitude




2SLS/IV • Settler mortality rates
• Distance from the




• Government antidiversion policies 
(GADP) ( + )
(this index is a weighted average of he 
following indicators: Law and order; 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, government repudiation of 
contracts)




•  Fraction population 
speaking English at 
birth
• Fraction population 
speaking a western 
language at birth
* (+)=positive relationship; (-) negative relationship; l=lnsignificant; NR=not robust; NA=Not evaluated; FDI=Foreign Direct Investment
Source: Original Studies
Appendix C: Variables Definitions
Table C.1: List of Variables
Variable Definition
Y Output
Hy Human capital employed in the manufacturing sector
H A Human capital engaged in R&D
H = H y + H a








P a Price of a patent
Wy Wages in the final good sector
w A Wages in the R&D sector
C Consumption
9 a Growth rate of innovation
9 t Rate of Institutional changes
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Appendix D: institutions Binding the Adoption of New Technologies: The Case
of Genetically Modified Crops
The first genetically modified seeds were produced and planted in the U.S. 
during the early 1970s. The development of the hybrid corn seeds (cytoplasmic male 
sterility - CMS) systematically changed the production of corn in the U.S. and 
provided the basis for significant improvements in the productivity of U.S. agriculture 
(Weingartner, 2002; Larson and Cardwell, 2004). According to Larson and Cardwell 
(2004), in the U.S. “[a]t the present time hybrid seed is used on essentially all land 
planted to corn” (p.1). Moreover, transgenic seeds have spread throughout the 
world during the 1990s. According to a worldwide study conducted by James (2004), 
“approximately 8.25 million farmers in 17 countries planted biotech crops [e.g. corn, 
soybean, cotton, tomato, canola and potato] in 2004” (p.1). However, the 
production of genetically modified crops is highly concentrated in a few countries. 
The U.S. is the leading transgenic producer and accounts for 59 percent of the total 
global transgenic crop area. Argentina (20 percent), Brazil (6 percent), Canada (6 
percent) and China (5 percent) complete the list of the other major producers of 
transgenic crops (James, 2004)57.
The noticeable concentration of the production of transgenic crops in only a 
few countries and the fact that transgenic seeds have been widely available for
57 These numbers are calculated considering only countries growing 50,000 hectares or more of 
genetically modified crops.
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commercialization since 199658 posits a fundamental question: why are only a few 
countries engaged in the production of such crops and why does the U.S. alone 
account for the majority of the total global transgenic crop area?
Institutions certainly explain much of this observable fact. First, innovating 
countries may be afraid of delivering new technologies to countries with a poor 
system of property rights protection (Krattiger, 1997). In this case, institutionally 
backward countries are not able to learn and adapt the new technologies because 
they have no access to the technology needed to manipulate the genetically altered 
seeds. This may lessen the benefits of using transgenic seeds in institutionally 
backward countries. However, these countries would still be able to buy transgenic 
seeds from the leading innovating countries.
The second and perhaps the most important institutional constraint to the use 
of genetically altered seeds are the biosafety regulatory laws (Krattiger, 1997, 
James, 2004). While planting genetically modified crops began in the early 1970s 
and extensive research on this matter was conducted during the 1980s and 1990s, 
concerns about biosafety prevented the commercialization of genetically modified 
crops until the early 1990s. According to James and Krattiger (1996), “China was the 
first country to commercialize transgenics [tobacco and tomatoes] in the early 
1990s”(p.7). In 1994 the U.S. government authorized the commercialization of 
transgenic tomatoes and by 1996 the list of authorized genetically modified products 
included corn, soybeans, cotton, canola, potatoes and squash. In 1995 these crops 
were also commercialized in six other countries (e.g. China and Canada) plus the 
members of the European Union (James and Krattiger, 1996).
58 The U.S., Canada and other ‘transgenic’ countries started to commercialize transgenic crops in 
1996. (James and Krattiger, 1996).
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While all OECD countries have regulations concerning the commercialization 
of genetically modified crops and by products from these crops, the process for 
approving the commercialization of genetically modified crops in developing 
countries progressed very slowly.59 Institutional constraints have prevented these 
countries from using transgenic crops. Specifically, a group of developing countries 
completely lacks regulation for this sector and another group of developing countries 
has only embryonic regulatory systems (e.g. Brazil and Argentina), which in general 
create difficulties hindering the planting and commercialization of genetically 
modified crops and the byproducts from genetically modified crops (James and 
Krattiger, 1996). However, “[f]ailure to do so [regulate the use of genetically 
modified crops] will result in delayed access to transgenic crops that will directly 
impact on their ability to increase crop productivity and their competitive advantage 
in terms of crop production in the domestic and international market place” (James 
and Krattiger, 1996:1).
59 “Genetic engineering of crops has been a controversial subject since 1971 when the first 
genetically modified organisms were developed. Concern about biosafety has led to Government 
regulation of transgenic crops in contained and field experiments to assess potential risk before 
the genetically engineered crops are approved for commercialization. The first field trials of 
transgenic crops featured herbicide resistance, used as a marker gene in tobacco in the USA and 
France in 1986. In the interim period, more than 3,500 field trials of transgenic crops have been 
conducted on more than 15,000 individual sites, in 34 countries with at least 56 crops, mostly in 
North America and the European Union. 91% of the trials have been conducted in industrialized 
countries, 1% in Eastern Europe and Russia and the balance of 8% in the developing countries 
with most in Latin America and the Caribbean, only 2% in the developing countries of Asia, 
almost exclusively in China and very few in Africa, almost all in South Africa.” (James and 
Krattiger, 1996:7).
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Appendix E: Institutions and the Use of Genetically Modified Crops: The Case
of Brazil
Brazilian regulations of biogenetic activities are very recent. The LEI N° 
8.974/1995 was the first legal arrangement created for the regulation of biogenetic 
activities in that country. While this law allowed field tests with genetically modified 
crops, it did not allow for planting or commercialization of transgenic crops. The 
Brazilian government approved the planting of transgenic soybean for the first time 
and under numerous limitations in late 2003, 8 years after the decision of the OECD  
countries to liberalize transgenic crops. This authorization was given to producers 
that were already raising transgenic soybeans (illegally) and had existing stocks of 
transgenic seeds from the 2003 harvest. The producers of transgenic soybeans 
could plant, in 2004, seeds from the 2003 harvest, but they were not allowed to sell 
the 2003 harvest to other producers that could potentially use the transgenic 
soybean as seed. All seeds not used or sold by December 31 of 2003 were 
supposed to be destroyed and any places where the seed had been stored cleaned. 
In addition, the 2004 harvest was not to be used as seed in the future and all 
products made from transgenic soybean were to be properly labeled, so that 
consumers could easily identify that they were transgenic. Except for the condition 
described above, this law prohibited the planting and commercialization of 
transgenic seeds.
In October of 2004 the government signed a decree (Medida Provisoria N° 
223) that allowed producers of transgenic soybeans to plant in 2005 their own 
transgenic seeds from the 2004 harvest. All other producers were prohibited from 
planting or commercializing transgenic crops. In addition, except for the soybean
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case discussed above, all other transgenic crops are still forbidden from being 
planted and commercialized in Brazil.
The Brazilian institutional arrangement on transgenic crops is still embryonic 
and the government has yet to create legislation that effectively regulates the 
production and commercialization of transgenic crops. While this productivity- 
increasing technology is widely utilized in countries such as the U.S. (world’s leading 
producer of corn) and Argentina, Brazil lags behind in the use of this technology due 
to institutional constraints.
The Brazilian transgenic experience well supports the argument that an 
economy will not operate at its production possibility frontier production when 
restrictive legislation prevents the use of new technologies and removes the benefits 
from introducing new technologies that are productivity-increasing. “It is obvious that 
consumers want their food to be safeguarded by rules that are rigorous enough to 
prevent any loopholes. But the legislation must not be so restrictive that it removes 
any incentive for introducing new food products that are potentially beneficial to 
society” (ISAAA, 2002:14).60
60 ISAAA -International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (2002). 
“Biotechnology: Myths & Facts.” SEAsiaCenter, Manila.
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/Publications/pdfs/mvths/Mvths%20 enqlish.pdf downloaded in 01/31/05.
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Appendix F: Data Analysis






Control of Corruption 104l1) 0.038 1.082
Rule of Law HQd) -0.003 1.064
Regulatory Quality 109(1) 0.070 0.979
Expropriation Risk 1 0 i(D 6.976 1.881
In Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 110(1) -1.481 3.159
In Population Density in the early 20th century (1,000 
inhabitants) 106(1) 2.532 1.673
Legal Origin - Socialist ' 110(1) 0.100 0.301
Legal Origin - French HQd) 0.545 0.500
Legal Origin - German 110<1) 0.045 0.209
Legal Origin - Scandinavian 110(D 0.036 0.188
Prop, land within 100km of the sea coast 110(1) 0.375 0.357
Absolute Latitude 110(1) 0.268 0.184
Mean Temperature 110(1) 20.075 7.331
In Patent Count, 1970-2003 - USPTO 76(2) 5.6060 3.4343
In Personnel engaged in R&D 76(2) 8.5276 2.0099
In Share of book production 76(Z) -4.1496 1.9265
In Patent Count, 1995-2001-World Bank 55(3) 7.9426 3.1122
In Personnel engaged in R&D 55(3) 10.322 1.7942
In Share of book production 55(3) -2.4941 1.8325
Source: Author’s compilation
(1) sample utilized in the analysis of the determinants of institutions, (2) sample used in the IV regressions with patent 
data from the USPTO; (3) sample utilized in the IV regressions with patent data from the World Bank.
Table F.2: Simple Correlation of Institutional Measures and Patent Count
Institutional
Measure
Patent Count 1970-2003 
USPTO
Patent Count, 1995-2001 
World Bank
Regulatory Quality* 0.60 0.42
Rule of Law* 0.68 0.58
Control of Corruption* 0.69 0.56
Risk of Expropriation** 0.80 0.76
Source: Author’s calculations; * number of countries=133; ** number of countries =85
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Table F.3: OLS Regressions of the Determinants of Institutions (Control of Corruption and Rule of Law)
Explanatory Variables
Control of Corruption Rule of law
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
In Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 0.044 0.033 0.090a 0.042 0.055° 0.060 0.094a 0.050°
(1.33) (0.76) (2.90) (1.27) (1.89) (1.56) (3.60) (1.73)
Legal Origin -  Socialist -0.983a -0.997 a -0.957 a -0.950 a -1.027a -1.003a -0.971a -0.991a
(-4.37) (-4.15) (-4.26) (-4.21) (-4.53) (-4.15) (-4.39) (-4.35)
Legal Origin -  French -0.356b -0.329b -0.351 b -0.337 b -0.387a -0.376a -0.380a -0.3713
(-2.50) (-2.24) (-2.34) (-2.36) (-2.74) (-2.57) (-2.62) (-2.61)
Legal Origin -  German 0.089 0.056 0.326 0.086 0.277 0.303 0.473 0.275
(0.27) (0.16) (0.97) (0.26) (0.84) (0.87) (1.43) (0.83)
Legal Origin -  Scandinavian 0.221 0.202 0.677° 0.263 0.031 0.019 0.407 0.069
(0.57) (0.51) (1.72) (0.67) (0.08) (0.05) (1.06) (0.18)
Prop, land within 100 km of the sea coast 0.620 a 0.657 a 0.315 0.660 a 0.544 b 0.600a 0.265 0.601 a
(2.73) (2.75) (1.44) (2.90) (2.46) (2.57) (1.29) (2-73)
Absolute Latitude 1.010 1.012 2.770 a 1.069° 1.069° 2.638a
(1.61) (1.60) (6.35) (1.72) (1.69) (6.54)
Mean Temperature -0.071 a -0.073 a -0.093 a -0.061 a -0.061 a -0.085 a
(-3.82) (-3.86) (-7.54) (-3.32) (-3.26) (-7.13)




Constant 1.244 b 1.349b -0.505 b 1.938 a 1.112 b 1.022° -0.406 b 1.849 a
(2.47) (2.18) (-2.39) (7.37) (2.22) (1.70) (-2.10) (7.06)
Sample size 104 104 104 104 110 106 110 110
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.52 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.65
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1 -4 is control of corruption and the dependent variable in models 5-8 is Rule of Law; a, b and c denote that the 
coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were 












Table F.4: OLS Regressions of the Determinants of Institutions (Regulatory Quality and Risk of Expropriation)
Explanatory Variables
Regulatory Quality II Risk of Expropriation
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
In Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 0.078° 0.080° 0.129a 0.082 ° 0.164° 0.147° 0.2723 0.165°
(2.30) (1.73) (4.22) (2.41) (2.30) (1.60) (4.01) (2.31)
Legal Origin -  Socialist -0 .853a -0.8413 -0.724 3 -0.8813 -1.064° -1.109° -0.713 -1.069°
(-3.27) (-2.99) (-2.82) (-3.39) (-2.04) (-2.00) (-1.35) (-2.06)
Legal Origin - French -0.097 -0.084 -0.116 -0.110 -0.562° -0.519° -0.555° -0.566°
(-0.60) (-0.50) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-1.86) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-1.89)
Legal Origin - German -0.091 -0.081 0.126 -0.090 0.262 0.181 0.679 0.264
(-0.24) (-0.20) (0.33) (-0.24) (0.38) (0.25) (0.95) (0.38)
Legal Origin - Scandinavian -0.017 -0.025 0.406 -0.047 -0.251 -0.361 0.634 -0.259
(-0.04) (-0.05) (0.91) (-0.10) (-0.30) (-0.43) (0.76) (-0.32)
Prop, land within 100 km of the sea coast 0.521° 0.558° 0.197 0.475° 0.258 0.400 -0.429 0.251
(2.05) (2.07) (0.82) (1.89) (0.54) (0.80) (-0.92) (0.53)
Absolute Latitude -0.839 -0.838 1.273° -0.200 -0.130 3.346
(-1.18) (-1.15) (2.68) (-0.15) (-0.10) (3.60)
Mean Temperature -0.078 a -0.078 3 -0.059 -0.142 3 -0.148 3 -0.138 3
(-3.66) (-3.56) (-4.25) (-3.60) (-3.68) (-5.26)




Constant 1.928 a 1.890 3 -0.045 1.350 3 10.3023 10.439 3 6.839 3 10.1643
(3.34) (2.66) (-0.20) (4.47) (9.61) (7.96) (15.28) (18.19)
Sample size 109 105 109 109 101 97 101 101
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.52
Notes: The dependent variable in models 9-12 is Regulatory Quality and the dependent variable in models 13-16 is Risk of Expropriation; a, b and c 
denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all 












Table F.5: IV Regressions of accumulated Patent Counts on Control of Corruption
u>to
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001-World Bank
explanatory vanaoies
Model 1 Mode! 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Control of Corruption 1.53a 1.79 a 2 .16a 1.788 1.79a 0 .858 1.06a 1.218 1.03 8 0 .998
(11.62) (9.45) (5.06) (9.70) (9.78) (5.57) (5.67) (3.33) (5.97) (5.86)
In Personnel engaged in R&D 0.49a 0.49 a 0.51 a 0.49 a 0 .49a 0.68 8 0.69 8 0 .688 0 .688 0 .688
(4.89) (5.19) (5.10) (5.20) (4.90) (4.59) (4.96) (5.25) (4.84) (4.86)
In Share of book production 0 .55a 0.46 a 0.44 a 0.46 a 0.46 8 0.67 8 0.60 8 0.56 8 0 .618 0.63 8
(4.96) (4.23) (3.48) (4.15) (4.19) (4.17) (3.60) (3.62) (3.77) (3.58)
Prop, land within 100 km of the sea coast - - -0.32 - - - - -0.87 - -
- - (-0.58) - - - - (-1.56) - -
Mean Temperature - - 0.05 - - - - 0.01 - -
- - (1.06) - - - - (0.21) - -
In population (aged 15-64) density - - - 0.01 - - - - 0.04 -
- - - (0.09) - - - - (0.29) -
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - 0.000 - - - - -0.001
- - - - (0.07) - - - - (-0.20)
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.000 - - - - 0.000
- - - - (-0.06) - - - - (0.38)
Constant 3.29 a 2.78 1.61 2.75 2.76b 2.09 1.71 1.82 1.69 1.88
(2.69) (2.41) (1.01) (2.27) (2.34) (1.21) (1.01) (0.98) (0.97) (1.11)
Method OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Sample Size 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Centered R-Squared 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) _ 3.03 5.31 5.26 5.25 2.01 4.87 5.80 4.34
[P-Value] [022] [0.26] [0.26] [0.26] - [0.37] fO.301 [0.22] [0.361
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is the 
natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, 
respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All 2SLS-IV regressions are 
estimated using the following set of instruments: In human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, mean temperature, and 












Table F.6: IV Regressions of accumulated Patent Counts on Rule of Law
UJu>
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001-World Bank
explanatory variames
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 1C
Rule of Law 1.64b 1.91b 2.17 b 1.92b 1.94b 0 .99b 1.16b 1.19 b 1.14 b 1.13b
(11.62) (10.36) (5.34) (10.52) (10.63) (5.82) (5.68) (3.72) (5.95) (5.84)
In Personnel engaged in R&D 0.41 b 0 .40b o c
r
0 .40b 0.41 b 0 .67b 0.68 b 0.67 b 0.68 b 0.68 b
(4.36) (4.45) (4.36) (4.38) (4.25) (4.59) (4.89) (5.10) (4.91) (4.88)
In Share of book production 0 .60b 0.52 b 0.52 b 0.53 b 0.52 b 0.65 b 0.59 b 0 .55b 0.60 b 0.61 b
(5.37) (4.55) (4.00) (4.52) (4.52) (3.94) (3.48) (3.54) (3.61) (3.42)
Prop, land within 100 km of the sea coast - - -0.21 - - - - -0.74 - -
- - (-0.39) - - - - (-1.41) - -
Mean Temperature - - 0.03 - - - - -0.01 - -
- - (0.75) - - - - (-0-25) - -
In population (aged 15-64) density - - - -0.05 - - - - -0.04 -
- - - (-0.54) - - - - (-0.30) -
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - 0.00 - - - - 0.00
- - - - (-0.45) - - - - (-0.33)
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.00 - - - - 0.00
- - - - (0.48) . - - - - (0.30)
Constant 4 .02b 3.67 b 3 .01b 3.87 b 3.65 b 2.01 1.74 2.11 1.83 1.79
(3.42) (3-19) (2.05) (3.20) (3.09) (1.16) (1.02) (1-20) (1.06) (1.05)
Method OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Sample Size 76 76 76 76 76 55 55 55 55 55
Centered R-Squared 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) _ 2.76 4.06 4.23 4.30 _ 0.96 3.54 4.17 3.20
[P-Value] - -JO.:*?] [0.401 [0.38] [0.37] - .. [0.62] J S iZ L .. [0.38] [0.52]
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is the 
natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, 
respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All 2SLS-IV regressions are 
estimated using the following set of instruments: In human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, mean temperature, and 












Table F.7: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts on Regulatory Quality
Explanatory Variables
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO I Patent count 1995-2001 -  World Bank
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Regulatory Quality 1.61a 2 .14a 2 .49a 2.25 3 2 .07a 0 .86a 1.58a 1.60a 1.53a 1.48a
(6.65) (9.12) (3.56) (9.88) (8.98) (2.98) (5.25) (3.51) (5.65) (5.50)
in Personnel engaged in R&D 0 .42a 0 .41a 0 .40a 0 .40a 0.42 a 0 .76a 0.86 a 0.86 a 0 .86a 0.86 a
(3.73) (3.56) (3.32) (3.63) (3.62) (4-36) (5.22) (5.10) (5.18) (5.18)
In Share of book production 0.79 a 0 .69a 0.66 a 0 .71a 0.71 a 0.69 a 0.48b 0.43b 0.49b 0.52b
(6.46) (5.83) (5.11) (6.18) (6.03) (3.76) (2.22) (2.09) (2.41) (2.34)
Prop, land within 100km of the sea coast - - -0.70 - - - - -0.80 - -
- - (-0.87) - - - - (-1-16) - -
Mean Temperature - - 0.02 - - - - -0.02 - -
- - (0.26) - - - - (-0.50) - -
In population (aged 15-64) density - - - -0.18 - - - - -0.03 -
- - - (-1.55) - - - - (-0.22) -
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - -0.001 - - - - -0.004
- - - - (-0.32) - - - - (-0.58)
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.0000 - - - - 0.0000
- - - - (0.38) - - - - (0.66)
Constant 4.72 a 4.23 a 4.07b 4.86 a 4.26 a 1.29 -0.67 - - -0.34
(3.33) (2.92) (2.14) (3.26) (2.94) (0.60) (-0.33) (-0.08) (-0.23) (-0.17)
Method OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Sample Size 76 76 76 76 76 55 55 55 55 55
Centered R-Squared 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.80
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) _ 3.47 4.28 5.47 6.27 1.86 4.26 4.90 3.99
[P-Value] - [0.18] [0.37] [0.24] [0.18] - [0.401 .. MIL. [0.30] _J2dlL
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is the 
natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, 
respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All 2SLS-IV regressions are 
estimated using the following set of instruments: In human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, mean temperature, and 
proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast.
Table F.8: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts on Expropriation Risk
Explanatory Variables
Patent count 1970-2003- USPTO Patent count 1995-2001 World Bank
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Expropriation Risk 0.973 1.45a 1 .42a 1.45a 1.45a 0 .69a 1.073 1.303 1.02 3 0 .983
(6.38) (7.43) (3.63) (7.56) (7.68) (5.03) (4.83) (3.10) (5.01) (5.17)
In Personnel engaged in R&D 0.31 a 0.24b 0.25b 0.24b 0.23° 0.58 a 0 .543 0.50b 0 .553 0 .583
(2.86) (2.03) (2.32) (2.00) (1.87) (3.10) (2.81) (2.40) (2.91) (3.18)
In Share of book production 0.60 a 0.36b 0.39b 0.37b 0.35b 0.54 b 0.31 0.23 0.34 0.30
(4.31) (2.19) (2.14) (2.22) (2.15) (2.31) (1.35) (0.91) (1.54) (1.41)
Prop, land within 100km of the sea coast - - 0.42 - - - - -0.85 - -
- - (0.68) - - - - (-1.39) - -
Mean Temperature - - 0.01 - - - - 0.02 - -
- - (0.15) - - - - (0.55) - -
In population (aged 15-64) density - - - -0.06 - - - - -0.04 -
- - - (-0.52) - - - - (-0.26) -
Population (aged 15-64) density - - - - 0.00 - - - - -0 .01b
- - - - (0.25) - - - - (-2.37)
Population (aged 15-64) density Squared - - - - 0.00 - - - - 0.00013
- - - - (-0.23) - - - (3.41)
Constant -1.71 -5 .63b -5.69 -5.45 b -5.71 b -2.14 -5.33b -6.90 -4.81c -4.71b
(-0.89) (-2.41) (-1.35) (-2.31) (-2.52) (-0.82) (-2.08) (-1.69) (-1.87) (-2.02)
Method OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Sample Size 75 75 75 75 75 54 54 54 54 54
Centered R-Squared 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.84
Results from Overidentification Test
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) - 8.94° 7.93b 9.67b 8.90c - 2.86 0.40 3.72 4.49
[P-value] - (0.06] [0.02] [0.05] [0.06] - [0.58] [0.82] [0.45] [0.34]
Notes: The dependent variable in models 1-5 is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 and the dependent variable in models 6-10 is the 
natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, 
respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All 2SLS-IV regressions are 
estimated using the following set of instruments: In human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, mean temperature, and 
proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast.
Table F.9: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts -USPTO
Explanatory Variables
T=Risk of Expropriation T=Regulatory Quality T=Control of Corruption T=Rule of Law
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Institution (T) 1.34a 2.11° 2.05 a 1.95 3 2.00 3 2.02 3 2.03 3 2.08 3
(4.54) (1.82) (5.59) (7.93) (6.74) (5.39) (6.53) (5.58)
Institution Squared (TA2) - -0.04 - 0.80b - -0.16 -0.15
- (-0.57) - (2.25) - (-0.70) (-0.54)
OECD * Institution (T) 0.00 - -0.18 - -0.59 - -0.43
(-0.02) - (-0.32) - (-1.54) - (-1.08)
OECD 0.55 - 0.70 - 0.69 - 0.63
(0.25) - (1.18) - (1.28) - (1.18)
In Personnel engaged in R&D 0.23c 0.22 0.39a 0.563 0.50 3 0.49 3 0.40 3 0.39 3
(1.80) (1.61) (2.84) (4.05) (4.07) (4.05) (3.31) (3.14)
In Share of book production 0.35b 0.37b 0.65 a 0.48 3 0.42 3 0.45 3 0.50 3 0.53 3
(2.33) (2.44) (4.87) (3.47) (3.41) (3.59) (4.05) (4.21)
Constant -5.03 -7.85 4.09b 1.35 2.55c 2.90 3 3.533 3.92 3
(-2,00)b l CD ro o (2.51) (0.73) (1.77) (2.01) (2.46) (2.52)
Method 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Sample Size 75 75 76 76 76.00 76.00
Centered R-Squared 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003; a, b and c denote that the coefficients are statistically 
significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran with standard errors robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity. The 2SLS-IV regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: In human capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin 
of the legal system, mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100km of the seacoast. For models 2 ,4  ,6 and 8, the squared measure of institutions are instrumented 
by using the set of instruments listed above plus the squared values of the following variables. In human capital density in the early 20th century, mean temperature, and 












______________________ Table F.10: IV Regressions of Accumulated Patent Counts -USPTQ
Explanatory Variables Institutional Measure
Control of Corruption Rule of Law Regulatory Quality Risk of Expropriation
Institution 2.75a 2.92 a 2.87 a 2.75 a 3.64 a 3.03 3 1.77a 1.78 3
(16.26) (6.00) (19.79) (6.29) (11.96) (5.31) (14.82) (4.37)
Proportion of land within 100 km of the sea coast -0.05 0.30 -0.03 1.04
(-0.08) (0.52) (-0.03) (1.51)
Mean Temperature 0.02 -0.01 -0.08° 0.01
(0.39) (-0.22) (-1.81) (0.19)
Constant -4 .01a -4.46 a -4 .10a -3.98 a -4.39 a -2.77 a -16.17 a -16.98 3
(-23.96) (-4.27) (-24.65) (-4-53) (-17.06) (-3.86) (-16.51) (-4.15)
Method 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Sample Size 93 93 95 95 95 95 92 92
Centered R-Squared 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.47 0.61 0.60 0.61
Overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) 2.27 1.92 1.78 1.42 7.51 1.12 10.65 7.38
[p-value] [0.69] [0.38] [0.78] [0.49] [0.11] [0.57] [0.03] [0.02]
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003 divided by population aged 15-64 years; a, b and c 
denote that the coefficients are statistically significant at 99%, 95% and 90% of confidence, respectively; t-ratios are reported between parentheses; all regressions were ran 
with standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All 2SLS-IV regressions are estimated using the following set of instruments: In Human Capital Density in the early 
20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, mean temperature, and proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast.
Appendix G: Figures
Figure G .1 : Rule of Law and Patent Production. 1970-2003
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Appendix H: Dataset




C Control of Corruption, Average 1996-2002
RL Rule of Law, Average 1996-2002
RQ Regulatory Quality, Average 1996-2002
Exprop Risk of Expropriation, average 1985-1995
Inptuspto Natural logarithm of the USPTO patent count between 1970-2003
lnpt_wb Natural logarithm of the World Bank patent count between 1995-2001
Inscien70 Natural logarithm of Personnel engaged in R&D, average 1968-1972
Inscien95 Natural logarithm of Personnel engaged in R&D, average 1995-1999
Sample A Observation included in the regression analysis - USPTO Patent data
Sample B Observation Included in the regression analysis - World Bank Patent data
Inbkshare70 Natural logarithm of Share of book production, average 1968-1972
Inbkshare95 Natural logarithm of Share of book production, average 1995-1999
Inpop70 Natural logarithm of population (aged 15-64) density, 1970
lnpop95 Natural logarithm of population (aged 15-64) density, 1995
Socialist Socialist Legal Origin
French French Legal System
English Common Law Legal System
German German Legal System
Scandin Scandinavian Legal System
ItlOOkm Proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast
meantemp Mean Temperature
latabs Absolute Latitude
Inschool20 Natural logarithm of Schooling Density in the early 20th century (1920)
140













Country IS03 c RL RQ Exprop Inptuspto lnpt_wb In'scien70 Inscien95 Sample A Sample B
Afghanistan AFG -1.5450
Algeria DZA -0.5900 -0.6775 -0.7975 6.5500 1.6094 5.5910 5.8348 Yes
Angola AGO -1.1200 -1.4350 -1.4825 5.3700
Argentina ARG -0.3525 -0.0100 0.2825 6.5000 6.8427 7.8571 9.7172 10.3428 Yes Yes
Australia AUS 1.9725 1.9075 1.3875 9.3200 9.5417 11.1080 10.6674 11.4358 Yes Yes
Austria AUT 1.8375 1.9975 1.4125 9.7400 9.3524 9.9123 8.4399 10.3516 Yes Yes
Bangladesh BGO -0.6475 -0.7075 -0.4200 5.1800 0.0000 4.6250 7.7882 9.7189 Yes
Belgium BEL 1.3025 1.4875 1.0800 9.6900 9.4398 9.3910 10.0399 10.7454 Yes Yes
Benin BEN -0.3225 -0.0975
Bolivia BOL -0.6900 -0.5150 0.5250 5.7400 3.8067 2.8332 7.0901 6.5985 Yes
Brazil BRA -0.0075 -0.1950 0.2600 7.9000 7.3139 9.7224 8.9522 10.9743 Yes Yes
Bulgaria BGR -0.3600 -0.0925 0.2950 8.9200 6.1633 7.7039 10.4090 9.8548 Yes Yes
Burkina Faso BFA -0.3900 -0.5800 -0.1925 4.5000 6.6320
Burundi BDI -0.8675 -1.1225 0.0000 7.2513
Cambodia KHM -0.9025 -0.7975 -0.2275
Cameroon CMR -1.0825 -1.1000 -0.4200 6.4200 0.0000 5.6168 5.3083 Yes
Canada CAN 2.2075 1.8875 1.3225 9.7400 11.0321 10.3685 10.4502 11.8512 Yes Yes
Central African Republic CAF -0.6375 -0.5725 4.8520 6.9717
Chad TCD -0.7275 -0.5250 0.0000 4.9127
Chile CHL 1.3650 1.2700 1.3375 7.8200 5.2730 6.4151 8.7376 9.4430 Yes Yes
China CHN -0.2400 -0.2975 -0.1950 7.7900 7.4260 11.5581 13.6169 Yes
Colombia COL -0.4725 -0.6250 0.2400 7.3900 5.1874 6.2305 7.0388 8.5980 Yes Yes
Congo COG -0.9050 -1.1950 -0.9200 4.6300 5.4972
Congo, Democratic
Republic (zaire) ZAR -1.5625 -1.8200 -2.3875 3.6600 0.6931 1.6094
Costa Rica CRI 0.8400 0.7375 0.7950 6.9700 4.3175 5.7683 7.5316 Yes
Cuba CUB -0.1875 -0.6900 -1.1150 7.0200 4.0604 6.0210 8.9449 11.0190 Yes Yes
Ivory Cost CIV -0.3650 -0.7275 -0.1375 7.0000 1.3863 6.2934 Yes
Denmark DNK 2.3200 1.9625 1.4750 9.7400 8.9461 9.9447 9.4122 10.4058 Yes Yes
Dominican Republic DOM -0.3900 -0.2925 0.1600 6.2500 3.1781 8.9666 Yes
Ecuador ECU -0.8700 -0.5725 -0.1750 6.5600 3.5553 3.6376 8.3795 8.0430 Yes Yes












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset
Country IS03 c RL RQ Exprop Inptuspto lnpt_wb Inscien70 Inscien95 Sample A Sample
El Salvador SLV -0.4350 -0.3875 0.7900 5.0100 3.0910 1.0986 7.1861 7.9983 Yes Yes
Finland FIN 2.3900 2.0375 1.6175 9.7400 9.1926 10.0718 9.1378 10.7437 Yes Yes
France FRA 1.4900 1.4550 0.9925 9.7400 11.4260 11.8238 11.8524 12.6528 Yes Yes
Gabon GAB -0.8275 -0.3950 -0.1800 7.8100 3.3322
Germany DEU 1.8450 1.8325 1.3575 9.9100 12.3947 13.0642 12.3305 13.0633 Yes Yes
Greece GRC 0.6450 0.7350 0.8800 7.7800 5.9687 7.1033 8.3729 10.0577 Yes Yes
Guatemala GTM -0.7450 -0.7300 0.2950 5.1200 3.8286 3.8501 6.7370 Yes
Guinea GIN -0.3675 -0.8700 -0.1750 6.5500 0.6931
Haiti HTI -1.1225 -1.3525 -1.0500 3.7700 2.9957 1.3863
Honduras HND -0.7675 -0.7750 0.0550 5.3300 3.1355 3.5835 6.6187 7.6811 Yes
Hungary HUN 0.6600 0.7875 0.9800 9.0100 7.8099 8.5260 10.6941 9.9607 Yes Yes
India IND -0.2300 0.1250 -0.1775 8.2800 7.3790 9.5655 11.5165 12.7152 Yes Yes
Indonesia IDN -0.9200 -0.7525 -0.2050 7.5300 4.6913 3.6889 9.8699 11.8164 Yes Yes
Iran IRN -0.6000 -0.5575 -1.3950 4.7800 4.0431 7.5022 8.4384 10.8263 Yes Yes
Iraq IRQ -1.3150 -1.5875 -2.9225 1.8100 2.1972 4.2195 6.9108 Yes
Ireland IRL 1.7725 1.7650 1.5450 9.7400 7.4372 8.6841 7.9899 9.3667 Yes
Israel ISR 1.2775 1.0625 0.9300 8.5900 9.3136 9.4921 8.0064 9.4485 Yes Yes
Italy ITA 0.7800 0.9175 0.8550 9.4600 10.5003 10.3641 10.8550 11.8696 Yes Yes
Jamaica JAM -0.3075 -0.2400 0.4425 7.0400 3.5264 2.6391 8.6933 6.7020 Yes
Japan JPN 1.2600 1.6150 0.7550 9.7400 13.2146 14.5999 12.8891 13.7137 Yes Yes
Jordan JOR 0.0600 0.4225 0.3400 6.7600 2.8332 4.9488 10.0836 Yes
Kenya KEN -1.0075 -0.9525 -0.3175 6.1500 3.5264 4.6540 7.3796 Yes
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
of PRK -0.7450 -1.0675 -1.8725 4.5300 0.0000
Korea, Republic of KOR 0.3675 0.7800 0.5425 8.7100 10.2897 12.9374 9.1182 11.8525 Yes Yes
Lao People's Dem. Rep. LAO -0.9325 -1.1075 -1.1675 5.8972
Lebanon LBN -0.3400 -0.1150 0.1200 5.1600 3.9120 6.0088 Yes
Liberia LBR -1.2975 -1.6925 -2.0100 3.6500 0.6931
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya LBY -0.8775 -0.9650 -2.0850 5.2500 0.6931 2.4849 5.2575 Yes
Madagascar MDG -0.2800 -0.6625 -0.2325 4.5100 1.3863 3.1355 5.6971 6.9921 Yes Yes
Malawi MWI -0.6375 -0.3875 -0.1675 6.7900 1.0986 2.8904 2.6391 Yes
Malaysia MYS 0.4475 0.6875 0.5500 7.9800 5.8608 5.1874 7.2145 8.8609 Yes Yes












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset
Country IS03 C RL RQ Exprop Inptuspto lnpt_wb Inscien70 Inscien95 Sample A Sample B
Mauritania MRT -0.4675 -0.3150 0.6931
Mauritius MUS 0.4250 0.8475 0.4200 1.7918 2.1972 5.0876 7.1869 Yes Yes
Mexico MEX -0.3375 -0.2700 0.5975 7.5100 7.4170 7.9384 8.9534 10.5152 Yes Yes
Morocco MAR 0.1075 0.2900 0.1575 7.0900 3.5264 5.2679
Mozambique MOZ -0.6725 -0.8925 -0.4950 6.4900 0.0000
Myanmar MMR -1.2525 -1.2675 -1.3775 5.9000 1.3863 7.7053 Yes
Netherlands NLD 2.2400 1.9150 1.6875 10.0000 10.2664 10.5425 10.9130 11.3302 Yes Yes
New Zealand NZL 2.3150 2.0100 1.5950 9.7400 7.5401 9.1426 7.4348 9.3697 Yes Yes
Nicaragua NIC -0.5475 -0.7500 0.0275 5.1600 2.3979 3.0445 6.4297
Niger NER -0.7975 -0.8750 -0.5475 5.1000 4.5433
Nigeria NGA -1.1475 -1.2125 -0.7450 5.4900 3.5835 7.9431 9.4852 Yes
Norway NOR 2.0825 2.0425 1.2475 9.9000 8.3561 9.2166 9.1484 10.1358 Yes Yes
Pakistan PAK -0.7725 -0.6100 -0.4700 6.0600 3.0910 4.3041 8.5841 10.5107 Yes Yes
Panama PAN -0.3375 0.0500 0.8025 5.9300 3.8286 3.6376 6.2246 7.1997 Yes
Paraguay PRY -0.9150 -0.8000 -0.2875 6.9200 2.0794 4.8978 7.6138
Peru PER -0.1450 -0.4325 0.5550 5.9400 4.4543 4.9972 7.7668 8.6479 Yes Yes
Philippines PHL -0.4325 -0.2875 0.3750 5.4600 5.3936 6.6187 7.8656 9.5873 Yes Yes
Poland POL 0.4325 0.5750 0.6100 7.6700 6.4800 9.5573 11.8004 11.3142 Yes Yes
Portugal PRT 1.3575 1.2625 1.2275 9.1400 5.2257 6.6386 8.3075 9.8927 Yes Yes
Romania ROM -0.3425 -0.2125 -0.0900 7.2800 5.7900 8.9976 10.4271 10.7415 Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia SAU 0.1725 0.6675 -0.0375 7.6000 5.3230 5.5094 10.4156 Yes
Senegal SEN -0.3450 -0.2250 -0.2675 6.0000 1.3863 6.8112 4.2767
Sierra Leone SLE -0.9625 -0.9275 -1.0600 5.8400 0.0000
Singapore SGP 2.3400 2.0300 1.9400 9.3200 7.6468 9.1147 5.9135 9.5711 Yes
Somalia SOM -1.4475 -1.7900 -2.3800 3.0000
South Africa ZAF 0.4650 0.2600 0.3100 6.9600 8.0618 6.1759 10.4311 Yes
Spain ESP 1.3550 1.2600 1.2225 9.6200 8.4018 9.8876 8.9049 11.5459 Yes Yes
Sri Lanka LKA -0.1600 0.0550 0.3850 6.0700 2.8904 4.8752 8.9134 8.3619 Yes Yes
Sudan SDN -0.9950 -1.2950 -1.1450 4.0100 1.6094 2.8904 7.8633 Yes
Sweden SWE 2.3275 1.9425 1.3550 9.5200 10.3459 10.8220 10.1873 11.1290 Yes Yes
Switzerland CHE 2.2350 2.1650 1.3750 10.0000 10.6625 10.4716 9.7036 10.8444 Yes Yes
Syrian Arab Republic SYR -0.5700 -0.3675 -0.9575 5.8000 2.7081 5.5175 10.1074 6.6896 Yes Yes
Thailand THA -0.2275 0.3975 0.4175 7.6100 5.3230 7.6183 8.3357 9.4210 Yes Yes
Togo TGO -0.6775 -0.8650 -0.4275 6.8400 4.9127
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 0.1900 0.3850 0.6500 7.4200 3.9703 3.2958 6.3491 7.2563












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset
Country IS03 c RL RQ Exprop Inptuspto lnpt_wb Inscien70 Inscien95 Sample A Sample B
Turkey TUR -0.1525 0.0700 0.3925 7.4600 4.8203 7.5570 8.8885 10.0086 Yes Yes
Uganda UGA -0.7300 -0.6025 0.1550 4.4600 1.7918 2.1972 6.9373 Yes
United Kingdom GBR 2.0600 1.9075 1.6375 9.7900 11.4695 12.1020 11.9185 12.5883 Yes Yes
United Rep. of Tanzania TZA -0.9800 -0.4150 -0.1975 6.7500 2.0794 0.6931 9.6173 Yes
United States of America USA 1.7725 1.7725 1.4575 10.0000 14.4058 13.7123 13.5312 14.5373 Yes Yes
Uruguay URY 0.5900 0.5500 0.8325 7.0700 3.6636 5.0434 7.7337 6.9641 Yes Yes
Venezuela VEN -0.7450 -0.7725 -0.2675 7.1000 6.3439 6.0845 8.0609 8.6646 Yes
Viet Nam VNM -0.6625 -0.6025 -0.6050 6.5700 2.3026 4.9345 8.3948 10.5506 Yes Yes
Zambia ZMB -0.8225 -0.4150 0.0825 6.6800 1.7918 3.2581 6.5117 7.6275












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset
Country_______ Inbkshare70 Inbkshare95 Inpop70 lnpop95 Socialist French English German Scandin Sample A Sample B
Afghanistan -7.1348 2.3350 2.8956 0 1 0 0 0
Algeria -5.5288 -5.0873 1.0087 1.9151 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Angola -9.1158 -7.9927 0.8894 1.4605 0 1 0 0 0
Argentina -2.7828 -1.8356 1.7074 2.0292 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Australia -2.9085 -1.7829 0.0217 0.4475 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Austria -2.6753 -2.0794 3.9986 4.1557 0 0 0 1 0 Yes Yes
Bangladesh -5.0009 5.4648 6.1493 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Belgium -2.7365 -0.9032 5.2937 5.3924 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Benin -8.8866 2.4809 3.1710 0 1 0 0 0
Bolivia -6.0248 0.7209 1.3317 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Brazil -2.2494 -1.0829 1.8062 2.4766 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Bulgaria -2.9478 -2.6139 3.9461 3.9270 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Burkina Faso -8.6859 2.3576 2.8690 0 1 0 0 0
Burundi 4.1870 4.7124 0 1 0 0 0
Cambodia 3.0295 3.3831 1 0 0 0
Cameroon -7.4817 -7.1325 2.0267 2.6827 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Canada -2.8303 -1.1479 0.2816 0.6888 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Central African Republic 0.5067 1.0448 0 1 0 0 0
Chad 0.4371 0.9797 0 1 0 0 0
Chile -4.0878 -3.5051 1.9439 2.4852 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
China 0.5209 3.8615 4.4350 1 0 0 0 Yes
Colombia -4.4524 -2.5079 2.3102 3.0290 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Congo 0.7205 1.4797 0 1 0 0 0
Congo, Democratic
Republic (zaire) -8.9980 -6.3653 1.5401 2.2494 0 1 0 0 0
Costa Rica -5.4848 -4.0371 2.8473 3.7097 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Cuba -4.3451 -4.4219 3.7776 4.2188 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Ivory Cost -6.8132 2.1836 3.1188 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Denmark -2.6085 -1.5972 4.3000 4.4037 0 0 0 1 Yes Yes
Dominican Republic -7.7295 3.8090 4.5451 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Ecuador -7.7295 -4.4439 2.3814 3.1703 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset_______________________________________
Country_______ Inbkshare70 Inbkshare95 Inpop70 lnpop95 Socialist French English German Scandin Sample A Sample B
El Salvador -7.5317 -5.1358 4.4656 5.0516 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Finland -2.5009 -1.6053 2.2031 2.3140 0 0 0 0 1 Yes Yes
France -1.1927 -0.4086 4.0575 4.2362 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Gabon 0.1500 0.8351 0 1 0 0 0
Germany -0.5413 0.1468 4.9227 5.0511 0 0 0 1 0 Yes Yes
Greece -3.5575 -2.7549 3.7528 3.9808 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Guatemala -5.9588 3.2070 3.8554 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Guinea 2.1155 2.6417 0 1 0 0 0
Haiti -5.2548 4.4831 4.9253 0 1 0 0 0
Honduras -6.0773 2.4353 3.2844 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Hungary -2.5345 -1.8833 4.3195 4.3111 1 0 0 0 0 Yes Yes
India -1.6763 -1.6576 4.5340 5.1381 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Indonesia -3.8403 -3.6783 3.5131 4.1386 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Iran -3.3186 -1.6062 2.1874 2.9561 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Iraq -4.8237 2.3894 3.2491 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Ireland -4.9707 3.1859 3.4951 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Israel -3.5924 -3.4985 4.4570 5.0912 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Italy -2.1454 -0.6548 4.7476 4.8671 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Jamaica -6.2465 4.3909 4.8892 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Japan -0.8506 -0.1467 5.2485 5.4411 0 0 0 1 0 Yes Yes
Jordan -6.2974 -4.8935 2.1541 3.2724 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Kenya -6.0135 -5.1515 2.2440 3.1481 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
of 4.2300 4.7847 1 0 0 0 0
Korea, Republic of -2.7722 -0.6742 5.1767 5.7832 0 0 0 1 0 Yes Yes
Lao People's Dem. Rep. -6.6955 -6.6065 1.8427 2.3403 1 0 0 0 0
Lebanon -4.7867 -5.0849 4.8579 5.4547 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Liberia 1.8870 2.4132 0 0 1 0 0
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -5.7442 -0.5268 0.4513 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Madagascar -6.0079 -6.3047 1.8069 2.4710 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Malawi -7.0521 -6.0665 2.9677 3.6710 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Malaysia -4.1733 -2.4178 2.8398 3.6270 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset
Country_______ Inbkshare70 Inbkshare95 lnpop70 lnpop95 Socialist French English German Scandin Sample A Sample B
Mauritania -0.4100 0.1546 0 1 0 0 0
Mauritius -7.1177 -6.8941 5.4730 5.9941 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Mexico -2.9319 -2.2938 2.5365 3.3259 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Morocco -6.3912 -4.2870 2.3388 3.0809 0 1 0 0 0
Mozambique -6.3912 1.8449 2.3494 0 1 0 0 0
Myanmar -3.6594 -3.5745 3.0832 3.6693 1 0 0 0 0 Yes
Netherlands -1.8687 -0.6477 5.2801 5.5394 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
New Zealand -3.9941 -2.5212 1.8366 2.1897 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Nicaragua 2.0862 2.8796 0 1 0 0 0
Niger -8.0598 0.4846 1.2342 0 1 0 0 0
Nigeria -4.1365 -3.9030 3.4025 4.1204 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Norway -2.8052 -2.3697 2.0134 2.1617 0 0 0 0 1 Yes Yes
Pakistan -3.7313 -6.8353 3.7178 4.4057 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Panama -6.2465 2.3000 3.0272 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Paraguay 1.0548 1.8458 0 1 0 0 0
Peru -4.5019 -3.9014 1.6851 2.4048 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Philippines -4.9395 -4.1681 4.1440 4.8717 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Poland -1.9846 -1.4329 4.2106 4.4018 1 0 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Portugal -2.5589 -2.3632 4.1066 4.2880 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Romania -2.2298 -2.2802 4.0223 4.1664 1 0 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia -6.7885 -2.8306 0.4277 1.5853 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Senegal 2.4107 3.0975 0 1 0 0 0
Sierra Leone -6.8778 3.0145 3.5139 0 0 1 0 0
Singapore -4.9609 7.5248 8.2659 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Somalia 1.0678 1.7512 0 0 1 0 0
South Africa -3.4297 -2.4863 2.2786 2.9696 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Spain -1.2880 -0.2307 3.7299 3.9685 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Sri Lanka -3.8820 -2.8199 4.6577 5.1362 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Sudan -6.1714 1.1179 1.8296 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
Sweden -2.2611 -1.6118 2.4600 2.5256 0 0 0 0 1 Yes Yes
Switzerland -2.2670 -1.4101 4.5898 4.7522 0 0 0 1 0 Yes Yes
Syrian Arab Republic -5.0662 -6.8353 2.7590 3.6910 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Thailand -3.5304 -2.0790 3.5907 4.3342 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Togo -9.4743 2.9162 3.5670 0 1 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 4.6168 5.0457 0 0 1 0 0












Continued: Table H.2: Dataset
Country_______ Inbkshare70 Inbkshare95 Inpop70 lnpop95 Socialist French English German Scandin Sample A Sample B
Turkey -2.4764 -2.3788 3.2046 3.9038 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Uganda -5.8723 -5.4208 3.0458 3.7372 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
United Kingdom -0.8044 0.4931 4.9573 5.0356 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
United Rep. of Tanzania -7.3241 -5.9363 1.9975 2.7858 0 0 1 0 0 Yes
United States of America 0.0000 0.0000 2.5775 2.8884 0 0 1 0 0 Yes Yes
Uruguay -4.7655 -4.2454 2.3104 2.4376 0 1 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Venezuela -2.8285 1.7994 2.6602 0 1 0 0 0 Yes
Viet Nam -4.9186 -2.1160 4.1916 4.8567 1 0 0 0 0 Yes Yes
Zambia 1.0487 1.7978 0 0 1 0 0














Continued: Table B3.2 Dataset
Country_______ LUOOkm Meantemp Latabs Inschool20 Sample A Sample B
Afghanistan 0.0000 16.1000 0.3667 -6.8298
Algeria 0.0472 19.3000 0.3111 -2.7636 Yes
Angola 0.1188 22.9413 0.1367 -6.3545
Argentina 0.1231 17.1000 0.3778 -0.9035 Yes Yes
Australia 0.1990 20.9000 0.3000 -2.0455 Yes Yes
Austria 0.0076 6.6000 0.5245 2.3801 Yes Yes
Bangladesh 0.4016 25.6862 0.2667 2.1865 Yes
Belgium 0.4893 8.4000 0.5611 3.5083 Yes Yes
Benin 0.1090 26.8000 0.1033 -2.8036
Bolivia 0.0000 21.5000 0.1889 -3.0926 Yes
Brazil 0.0925 23.7000 0.1111 -1.9175 Yes Yes
Bulgaria 0.2737 10.7000 0.4778 1.8163 Yes Yes
Burkina Faso 0.0000 28.1000 0.1444 -7.1510
Burundi 0.0000 23.3900 0.0367 -0.8237
Cambodia 0.2243 27.2208 0.1445 -3.4749
Cameroon 0.0982 24.4333 0.0667 -6.5209 Yes
Canada 0.0212 -0.2000 0.6667 -1.6975 Yes Yes
Central African Republic 0.0000 25.4649 0.0778 -7.3433
Chad 0.0000 27.9722 0.1667 -11.6676
Chile 0.6602 13.4000 0.3333 -0.5112 Yes Yes
China 0.0517 11.7000 0.3889 -3.9487 Yes
Colombia 0.1597 22.5000 0.0444 -1.2267 Yes Yes
Congo 0.0479 24.7515 0.0111 -5.2509
Congo, Democratic
Republic (zaire) 0.0040 23.3546 0.0000 -3.9709
Costa Rica 1.0000 25.1000 0.1111 -0.3447 Yes
Cuba 1.0000 27.4000 0.2367 1.1723 Yes Yes
Ivory Cost 0.1711 26.0907 0.0889 -4.7030 Yes
Denmark 1.0000 6.8000 0.6222 2.4018 Yes Yes
Dominican Republic 1.0000 25.6000 0.2111 -0.5202 Yes
Ecuador 0.3684 19.1000 0.0222 -0.9887 Yes Yes












Continued: Table B3.2 Dataset 
Country_______ LtlOOkm Meantemp Latabs Inschool20 Sample A Sample B
El Salvador 1.0000 23.5710 0.1500 0.8454 Yes Yes
Finland 0.2833 0.2000 0.7111 -0.1281 Yes Yes
France 0.3292 11.2000 0.5111 1.9495 Yes Yes
Gabon 0.2618 24.5000 0.0111 -5.5602
Germany 0.1861 7.2000 0.5667 3.2374 Yes Yes
Greece 0.9300 16.9000 0.4333 1.4340 Yes Yes
Guatemala 0.4255 21.7000 0.1700 -0.6830 Yes
Guinea 0.1406 24.4389 0.1222 -3.7720
Haiti 1.0000 26.5803 0.2111 0.8785
Honduras 0.6686 25.4000 0.1667 -1.1358 Yes
Hungary 0.0000 9.0000 0.5222 2.2848 Yes Yes
India 0.1568 25.9000 0.2222 0.8470 Yes Yes
Indonesia 0.7458 26.8000 0.0556 -0.7927 Yes Yes
Iran 0.1012 23.3071 0.3556 -3.3820 Yes Yes
Iraq 0.0150 22.6062 0.3667 -2.7443 Yes
Ireland 0.9134 9.2000 0.5889 1.9255 Yes
Israel 0.9332 19.2000 0.3478 2.1650 Yes Yes
Italy 0.7775 13.4000 0.4722 2.7146 Yes Yes
Jamaica 1.0000 26.5000 0.2017 2.1248 Yes
Japan 0.9400 14.6000 0.4000 3.1831 Yes Yes
Jordan 0.1313 18.1000 0.3445 -1.4958 Yes
Kenya 0.0825 22.6000 0.0111 -2.0741 Yes
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
of 0.7420 8.2000 0.4444 0.2826
Korea, Republic of 0.8912 13.1000 0.4111 0.4847 Yes Yes
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.0766 25.4133 0.2000 -5.9277
Lebanon 1.0000 17.7616 0.3722 1.6688 Yes
Liberia 0.5436 26.0000 0.0700 -4.3650
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.1055 21.3000 0.2778 -8.8511 Yes
Madagascar 0.5710 23.3000 0.2222 -1.3847 Yes Yes
Malawi 0.0000 22.0000 0.1478 0.0536 Yes
Malaysia 0.7944 26.7000 0.0256 -1.6239 Yes Yes












Continued: Table B3.2 Dataset
Country_______ LtlOOkm Meantemp Latabs Inschool20 Sample A Sample B
Mauritania 0.0569 25.3000 0.2222 -10.2348
Mauritius 1.0000 23.5000 0.2241 2.6900 Yes Yes
Mexico 0.3726 19.0000 0.2556 -1.2662 Yes Yes
Morocco 0.3679 18.5000 0.3556 -3.5008
Mozambique 0.2899 23.6000 0.2017 -3.4972
Myanmar 0.2609 26.5443 0.2444 -0.2154 Yes
Netherlands 0.8560 8.6000 0.5811 3.2440 Yes Yes
New Zealand 0.9595 12.8000 0.4556 -0.1046 Yes Yes
Nicaragua 0.6327 26.6333 0.1445 -1.4492
Niger 0.0000 28.4000 0.1778 -7.2814
Nigeria 0.0978 26.6507 0.1111 -2.0663 Yes
Norway 0.4769 3.2000 0.6889 0.2420 Yes Yes
Pakistan 0.0942 23.5000 0.3333 -1.7994 Yes Yes
Panama 1.0000 27.5000 0.1000 -0.9019 Yes
Paraguay 0.0000 23.0000 0.2556 -1.7357
Peru 0.1732 20.5000 0.1111 -1.8460 Yes Yes
Philippines 0.9986 26.5000 0.1445 1.1346 Yes Yes
Poland 0.1658 6.4000 0.5778 2.3125 Yes Yes
Portugal 0.6085 16.0000 0.4367 1.1077 Yes Yes
Romania 0.0650 8.4000 0.5111 1.2884 Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia 0.1243 23.7000 0.2778 -8.3773 Yes
Senegal 0.2448 27.2000 0.1556 -3.4952
Sierra Leone 0.4662 26.2000 0.0922 -1.8752
Singapore 1.0000 27.1000 0.0136 -0.0393 Yes
Somalia 0.4475 27.2364 0.1111 -6.6986
South Africa 0.1963 17.7000 0.3222 -0.8131 Yes
Spain 0.4103 15.9000 0.4444 1.2718 Yes Yes
Sri Lanka 0.9936 27.6000 0.0778 1.8002 Yes Yes
Sudan 0.0232 28.5000 0.1667 -5.0870 Yes
Sweden 0.3016 2.4000 0.6889 0.5002 Yes Yes
Switzerland 0.0000 5.9000 0.5222 2.7054 Yes Yes
Syrian Arab Republic 0.1292 18.4000 0.3889 -1.3484 Yes Yes
Thailand 0.2726 27.2000 0.1667 -1.0437 Yes Yes
Togo 0.1677 26.8000 0.0889 -1.6415
Trinidad and Tobago 1.0000 25.9000 0.1222 2.2789












______________ Continued: Table B3.2 Dataset____________________
Country_______ LtlOOkm Meantemp Latabs Inschool20 Sample A Sample B
Turkey 0.3838 13.2000 0.4333 -1.0108 Yes Yes
Uganda 0.0000 21.5743 0.0111 -3.3380 Yes
United Kingdom 0.9234 8.8000 0.6000 3.1161 Yes Yes
United Rep. of Tanzania 0.0882 25.0902 0.0667 -5.6574 Yes
United States of America 0.1117 11.2000 0.4222 0.7843 Yes Yes
Uruguay 0.3123 18.4000 0.3667 -0.3042 Yes Yes
Venezuela 0.2444 24.8000 0.0889 -2.8543 Yes
Viet Nam 0.5703 25.5571 0.1778 -2.1047 Yes Yes
Zambia 0.0000 21.3000 0.1667 -3.6452
Zimbabwe 0.0000 19.6000 0.2222 -2.0840
to
